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SCALING COMMERCIAL LAW IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
by: Marc L. Roark*
ABSTRACT
How do you drive economic enterprise in a financial desert? Indian tribes,
academics, economists, and policy makers have considered the means and
methods for energizing economic growth for forty years. Efforts such as the
creation and promotion of the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act (“MT-
STA”) promise much toward creating conditions that would gather financial
opportunity to tribal regions that experience poverty at a strikingly higher rate
than any other place in the United States. And yet, while the law has been
available for more than ten years, tribes have been reticent to adopt it. This
Article fills the vacuum in the literature around the promise of uniform laws in
Indian Country by describing the inherent tension that exists between down-
scaling uniform laws into tribal contexts and the localism that seeks to pre-
serve localized values. This Article argues that tribal choices to accept
uniformity or reject uniformity in these areas are built around a combination
of formal associations and organic relationships designed to create “institu-
tional thickness” in the face of other scarce resources.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty years, economic activity in Indian tribes has fos-
tered a greater interest in creating and facilitating resources that
trickle down to tribal members. The unique place of tribes as separate
sovereigns has opened up  opportunities in gaming,1 natural re-
sources,2 smoke shops,3 and similar opportunities to exploit gaps in
the market that make their services either financially more attractive,4
or—such as in the case of gaming—available in regions where similar
services are not possible.5 Yet, despite the favorable market condi-
tions that Indian tribes experience due to their status as separate sov-
ereigns, the payoff of economic growth has been uneven. Indeed,
some tribes that operate in these sectors have only experienced margi-
nal economic growth (or none at all),6 while others have used the sud-
den increase in economic resources for social improvement.7 As Ezra
1. Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Ladine Oravetz, Tribal Economic Development:
What Challenges Lie Ahead for Tribal Nations as They Continue to Strive for Eco-
nomic Diversity?, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 446–48 (2001); Alan P. Meister,
Kathryn R. L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, Indian Gaming and Beyond: Tribal
Economic Development and Diversification, 54 S.D. L. REV. 375, 375–76 (2009).
2. Steven J. Shupe, Indian Tribes in the Water Marketing Arena, 15 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 185, 186–90 (1990).
3. Ansson & Oravetz, supra note 1, at 445.
4. See Matthew L. M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as a
Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759, 787–88 (2004). See gen-
erally Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989); Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Self-Determination
in the Age of Scarcity, 54 S.D. L. REV. 398, 398–418 (2009).
5. Kenneth W. Grant II, Katherine A. Spilde & Jonathan B. Taylor, Social and
Economic Consequences of Indian Gaming in Oklahoma, 28 AM. INDIAN CULTURE &
RES. J. 97, 107–13 (2004).
6. Ansson & Oravetz, supra note 1, at 441.
7. Grant et al., supra note 5, at 110–13.
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Rosser eloquently describes, these economic conditions are not
merely abstract but rather have life and death implications for tribal
members: “Indians living on reservations are poorer than any other
group in the United States, and this poverty is felt in everything from
the prevalence of substandard housing and lack of basic infrastructure
to shortened lifespans and high suicide rates.”8
Significant structural barriers are often the root problem of slow
economic growth on Indian tribes, despite the presence of favorable
conditions. For example, Robert Miller has pointed to how structural
barriers, such as federal policies relating to Indian tribal governance
or the lack of focus on economic development by tribes,9 have stymied
economic sectors otherwise poised for significant economic expan-
sion.10 The lack of capital opportunities in Indian territory has been
traced to not only high unemployment rates but also to economic
leakage—the rate that cash flows out of a region once it enters the
market place.11 Leakage can be contrasted to reinvestment where dol-
lars spent recirculate through regions.12
In recent years, the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) has facili-
tated a major effort to address structural gaps in Indian Country lend-
ing resources. The Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act
(“MTSTA”) and its successor, the Revised Model Tribal Secured
Transactions Act (“R-MTSTA”), have attempted to facilitate access to
capital on Indian reservations by facilitating familiar laws for lenders
in relation to chattel and personal property security. Nevertheless,
while the adoption of uniform tribal laws sets the conditions for po-
tential growth for Indian tribes, it does not alleviate other structural
barriers that may exist which continue to thwart economic activity.
Indeed, the experience of the MTSTA and R-MTSTA suggests that
significant structural barriers exist that may impact either the adop-
tion of these laws or the effectiveness of them once adopted.13 Se-
cured transactions laws can be found on only 62 tribes out of the 573
8. Ezra Rosser, Creating Space for Reservation Growth, 9 FIU L. REV. 351, 351
(2014).
9. ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2012).
10. Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or
Socialism Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 851–52 (2001).
11. MILLER, supra note 9, at 66–67.
12. Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Finance and Economic Development: The Fight
Against Economic Leakage, in AMERICAN INDIAN BUSINESS 82–88 (Deanna M. Ken-
nedy et al. eds., 2017) (noting the challenges that lack of secure financing presents
leading to loss of economic resources to nearby towns that are off reservation).
13. William H. Henning, Susan M. Woodrow & Marek Dubovec, A Proposal for a
National Tribally Owned Lien Filing System to Support Access to Capital in Indian
Country, 18 WYO. L. REV. 475, 486–89 (2018).
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federally recognized tribes.14 This is highlighted by the presence of
“credit deserts” in areas where Indian tribes are found.15
These two structural problems are not unrelated. The lack of famil-
iar, cost-saving creditor laws is one (but not the only) reason for the
lack of traditional lending enterprises in tribal regions. The geographic
distance between the center of a tribal community and its access to
reliable forms of credit is directly tied to the conditions that would
otherwise lead to capital growth for Indian tribes.16 This Article un-
packs the means and effect for how tribes have adopted secured trans-
actions laws, drawing on the concept of scale, to describe how the
theory and process of uniformity (a downscaling effect) can lose effec-
tiveness when tribes deviate from uniform approaches.
At a fundamental level, scale is a concept of measurement and com-
parison.17 Applied to physical assets or operations, the term
“scalability” refers to the ability to expand an existing concept or or-
ganization without changing the frames that supported it in the first
place.18 A project or concept that can be “scaled up” is one that can
be expanded beyond its natural parameters without changing the pre-
mise on which it was based. Scalability is not an “ordinary feature of
nature”;19 making projects “scalable” requires significant work and
still, some features of the expansion may be “unscalable.”20
Law itself is a scaled exercise, inasmuch as it seeks to define
problems or conflicts in relation to individuals and things, applying
frames, rules, principles, and norms to mitigate the complexities that
the infinite variety of human interaction and social life produces.21
Scale can be applied to measure size, relationships, and hierarchies.
14. See infra Appendix (offering a comprehensive catalogue of tribal adoptions).
15. Tristan Ahtone, Native-Owned Financial Institutions Battle Credit Deserts,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-na
tive-owned-financial-institutions-battle-credit-deserts [https://perma.cc/5682-DBS7];
Ronald A. Wirtz, Breaching the “Buckskin Curtain”, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS
(Sept. 1, 2000), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2000/breaching-the-buckskin-
curtain [https://perma.cc/VVE4-M4UW].
16. Ahtone, supra note 15 (“When we ask if we are meeting the credit and capital
needs of Indian Country, we will measure the distance between the community and
the nearest bank.”).
17. Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Some Problems with Scale, in THE MUSHROOM AT
THE END OF THE WORLD 37–38 (2015).
18. Id. at 38.
19. Id. at 43.
20. Sometimes, legal regimes can be replicated across different settings without
rendering imposing greater costs on the legal setting. But mostly, because legal
problems arise in context-specific settings, they often require significant effort to ef-
fectuate the same results at a different scale than the one the regime was designed for.
In contrast, the UCC has been the exception to the rule, often fitting across regimes.
21. See Cary Wu, Rima Wilkes, Daniel Silver & Terry Nichols Clark, Current De-
bates in Urban Theory from a Scale Perspective: Introducing a Scenes Approach, 2018
URB. STUD. 1, 2 (2018) (noting that dialectal scale is scale relating to relationships);
Hari Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from Property and
Criminal Law, 53 VILL. L. REV. 117, 147 (2008).
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For example, commercial law reduces the complexity of local
problems creating structures and frameworks that define relationships
among actors; the fact that commercial law happens at both a local
level (small) and a national or international level (large) invokes a
comparison of size. Secured transactions laws establish both relation-
ships and hierarchies between creditors and debtors. By determining
how creditors may create a security interest through the process of
“attachment,”22 the law defines when a relationship is governed by the
secured transactions law.23 Ordering those claims through a process of
perfection and filing establishes a hierarchy of how creditors may as-
sert claims against the personal property of debtors.24 Commercial law
then can be understood as a production of the state in that it manufac-
tures these relationships and hierarchies to frame and resolve collec-
tive problems, such as uncertainty that arises from dissimilar
approaches to securing collateral.25 Like the Fordist factory that scales
its application across a manufacturing state, law seeks to simplify con-
flicts by framing these through high-level principles and established
rules.
Uniformity is an exercise in applying legally scaled projects in dis-
tinct contexts. When governments adopt uniform laws (whether states
or tribes) they engage in a downscaling of one of the conditions that
22. Attachment is the creation of a security interest by a debtor in favor of a credi-
tor in which an interest in some property is associated to the debt obligation. Under
the UCC, the basic requirements for attachment are that the debtor have “rights in
the collateral,” that value be given to support the creation of the security interest, and
that the transaction have the indicia that suggests that the debtor intends to be bound
by the contract. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2020). This
version of attachment is replicated in the MTSTA and the R-MTSTA. See MTSTA
§ 9-202(b); R-MTSTA § 9-202.
23. The law creates different relationships by defining individuals, things, and
transactions. One of the powers of the law is to weigh those relationships against one
another—known as Dialectical Scale.
24. One of the important functions of secured transactions is to determine priority
amongst competing creditors. The body of law then is built to determine not only the
effectiveness of security interests, but their hierarchy. Scaled hierarchies are “the ef-
fects of efforts to sort, group, and categorize many things, people, and qualities in
terms of relative degrees of elevation or centrality.” See E. Summerson Carr &
Michael Lempert, Introduction: Pragmatics of Scale, in SCALE: DISCOURSE AND
DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL LIFE 3 (E. Summerson Carr & Michael Lempert eds., 2016).
25. James Scott defines this as a process of making problems more legible. JAMES
C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITION HAVE FAILED 3 (Nachdr. ed., 2008). Thus, just as states used maps to
make tax collection more efficient and adopted official languages to make govern-
ment bureaucracy accessible, law adopts approaches that seek to reduce problems
into solvable units. Id. Property law’s reliance on entitlements as a starting point for
understanding how and when entitlements shift helps courts and law makers under-
stand how the property system operates. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
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furthers economic growth and vitality.26 The process of creating and
adopting uniform law is taking a unit developed for one setting and
fitting it to larger or smaller contexts. Adopting uniform laws on In-
dian tribes downscales the law by reshaping it around the local con-
text. Uniformity in commercial law has long been regarded as a key
path toward reducing potential uncertainties that increase the costs of
conflict in commercial settings. Uniformity’s advantage has always
been toward avoiding the alternative of “scattered court decisions or
un-litigated traditions”27 in favor of a coherent set of principles that
parties can rely on in their commercial dealings. The process of uni-
formity involves a mix of stakeholders and legal experts who are
tasked with finding room for agreement that the law can be accepted
uniformly.28
The intended result of uniformity is to elevate what would be purely
local transactions to a broader, more regional effect.29 Commercial
law’s downscaling of uniform law to local practice in turn upscales
individual transactions to a broader network of commercial resources.
Thus, transactions are not purely “local” but rather enjoy access to a
stream of commerce that networks financial resources across locali-
ties, regions, and even nations. Transactions embolden the power of
the dollar by giving it currency in the local region, empowering greater
economic growth through collective resourcing, and reducing the leak-
age that occurs when money has nowhere to go. In short, when gov-
ernments (both states and tribes) deviate from expected patterns of
business and trade that firms have come to rely on, they hinder the
expansion of opportunities that require outside resources that purely
local regions cannot deliver on.
That does not mean that either scaling (upscaling or downscaling
legal regimes) or localizing economic norms are de facto rational or
irrational decisions. In fact, because scale-making is inherently rela-
tional and comparative, it “always entails drawing distinctions” based
on how choices impact other costs and gains.30 Scale-making often
“conflat[es] what is geographically, geopolitically, temporally, or mor-
ally ‘near’ while simultaneously distinguishing the qualities of near-
26. Truman Carter & Fred H. Miller, Uniform Laws and Tribal Legislation; One
Tribe’s Perspective, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 89, 89–104 (2001).
27. Raymond T. Nimmer, Uniform Codification of Commercial Contract Law, 18
RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 465, 465 (1992).
28. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial Law for the
New Millenium: Will the Current Process Suffice?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551, 555
(1992); Gail Hillebrand, What’s Wrong with the Uniform Law Process?, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 631, 634 (2000); K. King Burnett, The Uniform Conservation Easement Act: Re-
flections of a Member of the Drafting Committee, 33 UTAH ENV’T L. REV. 87, 87
(2013); James J. Brudney, The Uniform State Law Process, 8 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 3
(2002).
29. See Carter & Miller, supra note 26, at 104.
30. E. Summerson Carr & Michael Lempert, Introduction: Pragmatics of Scale, in
SCALE 3 (E. Summerson Carr & Michael Lempert eds., 2016).
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ness from that which is ‘far.’”31 Said a different way, uniform laws
may appear either rhetorically near because they promise to facilitate
greater economic expansion in concert with regional economic actors
(including other states and tribes); or they may appear rhetorically too
far, straining the tribe’s view of self-sufficiency, sovereignty, and gov-
ernance. When efforts to stimulate economic growth appear too far,
tribes may assert localism factors that reshape the regime to the tribe’s
particular vision for self-determinacy. In this way, a legal geography
approach can be useful for explaining how tribes have approached the
ULC’s MTSTA and other secured transactions laws.
Indeed, since the ULC released the MTSTA, only thirteen tribes
have adopted it as the basis for establishing security over personal
property, though several others have considered its implementation
over the years.32 While the MTSTA’s reception has been light, secured
transactions laws of some variety have been adopted by more than
sixty tribes. Most of these laws are based on uniform approaches to
Secured Transactions in the sense that they derive from either the
Uniform Commercial Code’s (“UCC”) Article 9 or the MTSTA.33
Yet, deviations still emerge in the implementation of the law. While
the law has been adopted by these tribes in different regions, its im-
plementation has been uneven. Some tribes have partnered with their
local state secretary of state offices to contract for filing systems, while
others have not set up local filing options. Even still, some tribal of-
ficers in tribes where the MTSTA or R-MTSTA were passed are una-
ware of the new laws, their purposes, or what they effect.
In Part I of this Article, I describe the adoption of secured transac-
tions laws in Indian Country. Looking to the form and the substance
of what tribes have adopted, I catalogue the different tribal laws in
five distinct approaches to secured transactions laws: incorporation of
state UCC provisions, adoption and modification of the ULC version
of Article 9, adoption of provisions of the ULC version of Article 9 in
limited contexts, adoption of the MTSTA, and non-uniform ap-
proaches to secured transactions. Additionally, in this part I catalogue
how tribes that have adopted a secured transactions law have dealt
with filing systems—an equally non-uniform collection of approaches.
In Part II of this Article, I begin to unpack some of the impacts that
scaling and scale-making have in the context of these laws. In this
Part, I point to various ways that tribes seek to further their economic
interests, including such methods as uniformity, relationship creation,
and networking. Likewise, I show how tribes impose localism over
uniform approaches, limiting the potential gains that uniform law can
provide. These efforts to localize economic interests include non-uni-
form approaches, limiting the types of transactions susceptible to uni-
31. Id.
32. See infra Appendix.
33. See infra Appendix.
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form approaches, limiting the actors who can take advantage of the
tribal laws, and maintaining their own filing system. These modifica-
tions reduce both the network potential and the downscaling potential
that uniformity offers. Drawing on economic geography, I argue that
some of the choices that tribes make in this context are inherently
relational, embedded in either formal associations or organic associa-
tions on tribal lands. Applying an economic geography approach to
how the adoption of commercially friendly laws interact with tribal
well-being is a new approach to both commercial law studies and In-
dian economic studies.34 This approach offers unique opportunities to
better understand barriers of receptivity experienced by Indian com-
munities toward commercial law adoptions.
II. SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Currently, sixty-two Indian tribes have a secured transactions law.
These laws fit into one of five broad categories: (1) tribes that have
incorporated the UCC adopted by the state where they are located (or
in close regional proximity to their tribal territory); (2) tribes that
have adopted the ULC version of the UCC; (3) tribes that have
adopted the MTSTA; (4) tribes that have adopted uniform provisions
relating to the sales of accounts or chattel paper; or (5) tribes that
have adopted a non-uniform law governing the creation of security
interests within their tribal territories. In addition to these different
modes of adopting secured transactions laws, there is a distinction in
some legislation about what entities have access to the tribal laws on
secured transactions—some legislation is adopted only for the benefit
of the tribe or other tribal enterprises, while some legislation does not
designate a class of persons for whom the law is designed to facilitate
secured lending.
Additionally, the variations for how tribes have structured their fil-
ing systems is as varied as the laws themselves. Some tribes have
opted to maintain their own recording system within the confines of
either a tribal court or some other tribal administrative office. Others
have opted to utilize the local (geographically proximate) filing system
of the state in which their territory is located. And finally, some tribes
have created compacts with those states for the purposes of maintain-
ing tribal filings. In this part, I depict what secured transactions laws
have been adopted and their nuances and variations.
A. Tribes That Have Incorporated the Local State UCC
into Tribal Law
Incorporating the local state UCC has its advantages for tribes
seeking to provide a clear sense of continuity between the commercial
34. See Andy Pike & Jane Pollard, Economic Geographies of Financialization, 86
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 29, 37–39 (2010).
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law surrounding tribal regions and the commercial law of the tribe.
The earliest incorporation of a state’s UCC provisions was by the
Lummi Reservation in Washington in 1985.35 Other tribes that have
incorporated their local state UCC include: the Bay Mills Indian Com-
munity (Michigan, 1994),36 the Chehalis Tribe, (Washington, 1995),37
the Fort Berthold Reservation (North Dakota, 2007),38 The Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (Michigan, 1999),39
the Ho-Chunk Nation (Wisconsin, 2004),40 the Kickapoo Traditional
Tribe of Texas (2012),41 the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Supe-
rior Chippewa (Wisconsin, 2010),42 Little River Band of Ottawa Indi-
35. See 26 LUMMI NATION CODE OF LAWS § 26.03.010 (2016), https://narf.org/nill/
codes/lummi/26Commercial.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H54-LU95]. The adoption is non-
uniform as it incorporates several amendments to the Washington UCC that apply on
the Lummi Reservation. Particularly, the Lummi Reservation excludes certain tribal
practices, such as gathering driftwood, fishing, and taking shellfish, from the commer-
cial code, id., and prohibits self-help remedies, id. § 26.03.090.
36. See SECURED TRANSACTIONS ORDINANCE OF BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMU-
NITY § 1 (1994), http://www.baymills.org/resources/Secured%20transactions%20ordi
nance.pdf [https://perma.cc/37MV-BEJR]. On November 15, 1994, the Bay Mills In-
dian Community adopted a Secured Transactions Ordinance that authorized the tribe
or its entities to create secured transactions in tribal property. See Memorandum from
Anne E. Bolton, Superintendent, Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Area Director, Minne-
apolis Area Office (Nov. 15, 1994) (on file with Author).
37. See 9 CHEHALIS TRIBE CODE § 9.25.010 (1995) (on file with Author). It ap-
pears that the tribe may have had an earlier version of Article 9 identified as Prior
Code § 6.1.1.030. The tribal code has been amended from time to time, including in
2007, 2015, and 2016. The code is limited to tribal transactions relating to tribal
property.
38. On December 17, 2007, the Fort Berthold Tribal Business Council approved
the adoption of the Three Affiliated Tribes of The Fort Berthold Reservation Secured




39. On May 12, 1998, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
adopted a Secured Transactions Ordinance, and that Ordinance was amended on Jan-
uary 16, 1999. GTB Secured Transactions Ordinance, enacted by Tribal Council on
May 12, 1998 (amended by Tribal Act #98-16.668, enacted by Tribal Council on Janu-
ary 16, 1999). The ordinance incorporates the UCC law in effect and expressly desig-
nated by the parties, and if no law is designated, the UCC as enacted by state law
according to the conflicts of law principles identified in the UCC. See 15 GRAND
TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL CODE § 104(a)
(2012), https://narf.org/nill/codes/grand_traverse/Title_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA4C-
4URK].
40. See Legislative Resolution 9/8/04C (Sept. 8, 2004) (adopting an ordinance in-
corporating the UCC as adopted in the State of Wisconsin into its tribal code). The
ordinance was amended on May 5, 2005. See 5 HO-CHUNK NATION TRIBAL CODE § 7
(2005), https://ho-chunknation.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/5HCC7Uniform-
Commercial-Code-Ordinance-05.05.05.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX88-9HE5].
41. See 25 KICKAPOO TRADITIONAL TRIBE OF TEXAS CODE § 1 (2012) (on file
with Author). The tribal law is enacted as Chapter 25 of the Kickapoo Tribal Code. Id.
42. See 12 LAC COURTE OREILLES BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA INDIANS
TRIBAL CODE § 16–21 (2010) (on file with Author). The Tribal Code incorporated the
Wisconsin version of the UCC with certain non-uniform inclusions relating to filing,
Tribal UCC 9 § 2.1001.501; notification to creditors for disposition of collateral, id.
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ans (Michigan, 2004),43 the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa
(Michigan, 2005),44 the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe (Connecticut,
2008),45 the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa (Minnesota, 2014),46 the
Mohegan Tribe (Connecticut, 1995),47 the Nottawaseppi Huron Band
of the Potawatomi (Michigan, 2008),48 the Pascua Yaqui Reservation
(Arizona, 2010),49 the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians (Michi-
gan, 2005),50 the Ponca Tribe (Iowa, 2009),51 the Red Cliff Band of
§ 2.1001.612; limitations on the ability of creditors to accept collateral in partial or
complete satisfaction of obligation, id. § 1001.620; elimination of special treatment
relating to waiver around consumer goods transactions, id. § 2.1001.602; abrogation of
remedies for secured party’s failure to comply with article, id. § 2.1001.624; and abro-
gation of an action in which deficiency or surplus is in issue, id. § 2.1001.626.
43. See Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, Ordinance No. 04-800-01 § 5.02
(2004), https://www.lrboi-nsn.gov/images/docs/council/docs/ordinances/Tribal_Se-
cured_Transactions_Ordinance_04-800-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXK8-LDSP]. The
incorporation of Michigan’s version of the UCC included a repeal of a prior secured
transactions ordinance known as the Tribal Uniform Commercial Code. See id. (“The
intent of this ordinance is to replace ordinance # 01-800-01 (the 2001 ‘Tribal Uniform
Commercial Code’) . . . .”).
44. See 12.201 LITTLE TRAVERSE BAND OF ODAWA TRIBE CODE § 1.5 (2003),
https://www.ltbbodawa-nsn.gov/TribalCode.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CSJ-S46V]. The
Little Traverse Band of Odawa Tribe incorporated Michigan’s version of the UCC via
ordinance to apply only to security interests granted by a tribal party. A tribal party is
defined in the ordinance as “the Tribe and any division, subdivision, branch, depart-
ment, board, committee, commission, agency, instrumentality, or entity wholly-owned
or wholly-controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Tribe, along with the successors and
assigns of each.” Id.
45. See 9 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION CODE § 1 (2008) (on file with
Author). The law provides for the incorporation of the Connecticut UCC for the crea-
tion of secured transactions on tribal property.
46. See 18 MILLE LACS BAND STAT. ANN. § 301 (2014), https://millelacsband.com/
content/3-government/13-legislative-branch/title-18-commercial-practices.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E4DQ-XS7Y]; WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERIES, § 9-101:2 (2017).
47. See Mohegan Tribal Ordinance § 95-720-1 (1995) (on file with Author). Article
III, Section 301 of this Mohegan Tribal Ordinance adopts as substantive law: (i) law as
set forth in any Mohegan Tribal ordinances or regulations, and (ii) the general stat-
utes of the state of Connecticut and cases interpreting those statutes, except those that
conflict with any written Mohegan Tribal law. Id.
48. See 4 NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI § 4.1-4 (2008),
https://ecode360.com/29876612 [https://perma.cc/Q2JJ-Y3MV].
49. See 7 PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE §§ 5-10, 5-20 (2010), https://www.pascuay
aqui-nsn.gov/_static_pages/tribalcodes/docs/7_PYTC/5_Secured_Transactions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FGK-DREE] (collectively known as the Secured Transactions Or-
dinance). The Ordinance adopted the Arizona UCC provisions with few modifica-
tions relating to sovereign immunity claims.
50. See POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CODE § 2A (2005), http://www.pokagonband-nsn.gov/sites/default/files/assets/depart
ment/government/form/2012/secured-transactions-code-836-633.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C5S8-TRH8] (incorporating Michigan’s version of the UCC into tribal law).
51. See 13 PONCA TRIBE OF NEB. TRIBAL CODE § 13-4-1 (2009), https://
www.poncatribe-ne.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/law_codetitle_v13_190501.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EDA-B42A] (incorporating Iowa’s version of the UCC into tribal
law). The limits of this ordinance relate to “the tribe, and all of its governmental
authorities, instrumentalities, subdivisions, subsidiaries, and departments, including
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Lake Superior (Wisconsin),52 the San Manuel Band of Mission Indi-
ans (California, 2004),53 the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indi-
ans (Michigan, 2005),54 the Snoqualmie Tribe (Washington, 2008),55
the Spirit Lake Tribe (North Dakota, 1988),56 the Stockbridge-Mun-
see Tribe (New York, 2005),57 and the Tulalip Tribe (Washington,
2001).58
the successors and assigns of all the foregoing.” Id. § 13-3-1; see also HAWKLAND ET
AL., supra note 46, § 9-101:2.
52. 52 RED CLIFF BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA TRIBAL CODE § 52.2.4,
http://redcliff-nsn.gov/Government/TribalChapters/Chapter52.pdf [https://perma.cc/
962Z-MPKP]. The Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior of Wisconsin incorporated the
Wisconsin version of the UCC as Title 52 of its Tribal Chapter, identifying Articles 1,
8, and 9 of the Wisconsin UCC as adopted by tribal law. The date of its adoption is
unknown.
53. See 25 SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS TRIBAL CODE § 25.4 (2004),
https://www.sanmanuel-nsn.gov/portals/1/TribalGovernment/TribalLaws/San_Manuel
_Secured_Transactions_Ordinance_Amended_July_12_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BTB6-2UT7]. The ordinance was subsequently amended in 2009 and again in 2016.
The law incorporates the California version of the UCC for purposes of security inter-
ests created by the tribe on tribal property or by tribal enterprises. Id. § 25.3. The
code incorporates the state filing system as the means of perfection.
54. See 99 SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL CODE
§ 99.101 (2005). The ordinance is limited to the creation of secured interests in gam-
ing-related enterprise property. Id. § 99.104(1). The ordinance incorporated the Mich-
igan UCC as in effect from time to time. Id. § 99.102(6).
55. See 14.3 SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL CODE § 3.0 (2008), https://www.snoqualmie
tribe.us/sites/default/files/secured_transactions_act.14.3.codified.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6EDL-BJEF].
56. In 1988, the Spirit Lake Tribe adopted Resolution A05-89-030, which created
the Spirit Lake Commercial Code. That Code included a chapter on secured transac-
tions. 10 DEVILS LAKE SIOUX LAW AND ORDER CODE § 11 (1988), http://
www.spiritlakenation.com/data/upfiles/media/Title_11_Commercial_Code.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QPM6-UVX8]. The secured transactions laws enacted by Spirit Lake incor-
porate the UCC as put forth by the American Law Institute (“ALI”) and National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”). The Code pro-
vides for filing as established by the North Dakota “Century Code Chapter 41-09.”
The Century Code is the official legislative reporter for North Dakota statutes. 41
NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE § 41-09 (1998), https://www.legis.nd.gov/cencode/
t41c09.pdf#nameddest=41-09-01 [https://perma.cc/4YCH-MD7D].
57. See 57 STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE TRIBAL LAW § 59.1 (2005), https://www.mohi-
can.com/mt-content/uploads/2015/11/ch-59-ucc_final_6-29-09_563a76ca77ea4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YJ9T-FF2T]. The Stockbridge-Munsee Community adopted a se-
cured transactions law that incorporated New York’s UCC. The law applied to any
security interest created under the jurisdiction of the Stockbridge-Munsee Tribe in-
cluding any created in tribal property. Id.
58. See 10 TULALIP TRIBAL CODE § 10.20.030 (2001), https://www.codepublishing.
com/WA/Tulalip/#!/html/Tulalip10/Tulalip1020.html [https://perma.cc/3UVJ-2X6U].
The Tulalip Tribe incorporated the state of Washington’s Commercial Code into its
tribal code. Adoption was uniform with the exception of place for filing. Id.
§ 10.20.030.
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B. Tribes That Have Adopted the ULC Version of the UCC
into Tribal Law
Some tribes have elected to adopt the UCC as developed by the
ULC, rather than any state-specific modifications to the UCC version.
This approach has the advantages of hewing closely to the original
UCC without the burden of non-uniform state amendments, if any.
Particularly, since most of the tribes that have adopted the ULC ver-
sion have added their own non-uniform amendments, it allows the
tribes to avoid conflict when their own tribal amendments may be in
conflict with state amendments.
To date, eight tribes have adopted or modified the UCC into tribal
law; those tribes include: the Cherokee OTSA (Oklahoma, 2001),59
the Eastern Cherokee Reservation (North Carolina, 2001),60 the For-
est County Potawatomi Community (Wisconsin, 2015),61 the Poarch
Band of Creeks (Alabama, 2004),62 the Rincon Band of Luiseño Indi-
ans (California, 2008),63 the Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in
Iowa (2007),64 the Seminole Tribe of Florida (2001),65 the Turtle
59. See 80 CHEROKEE CODE § 9 (2001), https://attorneygeneral.cherokee.org/me
dia/5upcrg3j/word-searchable-full-code.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CWP-8UZU]. In 2001,
the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma adopted Title 80 of its tribal code, based on the
UCC by the ALI and NCCUSL. The code includes a secured transactions section at
Article 9.
60. See 2 EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS TRIBAL CODE § 16D-1(a)
(2001), https://library.municode.com/tribes_and_tribal_nations/eastern_band_
of_cherokee_indians/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH16DUCOR
TRCAGAEN_S16D-1ADAR19 [https://perma.cc/924K-YNRT]. In 2001, the Eastern
Band of Cherokees adopted Articles 1 and 9 for the limited purpose of enabling the
tribe and any tribal related enterprise (particularly casino operations) to create se-
cured transactions. The ordinance was amended in 2003. It specifically incorporates
the most recent version of the UCC as published by the ALI and NCCUSL.
61. In 2015, the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe adopted the Model Tribal Se-
cured Transactions Act as Chapter 5-5, known as the Forest County Potawatomi Uni-
form Commercial Code: Secured Transactions Ordinance. See generally 5-5 FOREST
COUNTY POTAWATOMI UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SECURED TRANSACTIONS OR-
DINANCE (2005), https://www.fcpotawatomi.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Chapter
-5-5-UCC-05.09.2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHT2-2KRS].




63. In 2008, the Rincon Band of Luiseño Indians incorporated the UCC (Articles
1–9) into tribal law. The tribe later amended the law, making various amendments to
address specific tribal concerns. See Resolution No. 2008-03. The tribal law is known
as Rincon Tribal UCC and goes under the general numbering convention designated
by the UCC. 6 RINCON TRIBAL CODE § 6.500 (2008), https://rincon-nsn.gov/wp-con
tent/uploads/2019/05/6_0500-Tribal-Uniform-Commercial-Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JU6N-SGTY].
64. See SAC & FOX NATION CODE OF LAWS § 4-2101 (2007) (on file with Author)
(incorporating the UCC as adopted by the ULC).
65. The Seminole Tribe of Florida’s variation of the UCC describes itself as:
[T]he Seminole Tribe of Florida adopted a variation of UCC Revised Article
9 (together with relevant portions of UCC Articles 1 and 8) as its Secured
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Mountain Reservation (North Dakota, 2012),66 and the Warm Springs
Reservation (Oregon).67
C. Tribes That Have Adopted Provisions of the UCC Relating to
Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper
Some tribes, in lieu of adopting the entirety of the UCC, have
adopted provisions relating to the limited circumstance of selling ac-
counts or chattel paper. These provisions are aimed at encouraging
financial firms to do business on tribal lands by facilitating the negoti-
ability of instruments and paper that would limit those firms’ risk. To
date, there are currently six tribes with these adoptions: the Chi-
timacha Tribe of Louisiana (2004),68 the Fort Peck Indian Reservation
Transaction Ordinance, Ordinance No. C-01-01 (August 27, 2001). Under
the Seminole ordinance, the designated central filing office is the same as
under the Florida UCC, the privatized Florida Secured Transaction Registry.
Although Florida is a P.L. 280 jurisdiction and portions of the Florida UCC
might therefore apply on the Seminole Tribe’s reservation, the Seminole
Tribe’s Secured Transaction Ordinance was necessary to enable the tribe to
grant security interests in tribal assets, since the scope of revised Article 9 of
the Florida UCC still excludes any transfers by a government or a govern-
mental unit.







66. In 2012, the Turtle Mountain Reservation adopted a Uniform Commercial
Code based in part on the UCC. See generally 24 TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIP-
PEWA INDIANS COMMERCIAL CODE (2012), https://www.tm.edu/wp-content/uploads/
files/Academics/Paralegal%20Resources/TITLE%2024-Commercial.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YY8V-Y5NR].
67. The Warm Springs Tribe adopted a version of the UCC. In the introductory
Article, the Act describes itself as:
To the extent practical, this chapter follows Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC Article 9) published by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. However, this chapter has been
modified in some respects to suit the unique needs and situation on the
Warm Springs Reservation and to promote ease of understanding. In partic-
ular, the Tribal Council has determined that these types of matters are best
handled in an administrative forum that facilitates practical arrangements
between debtors and creditors and provides an expedited process that
quickly and fairly resolves disputes. In addition, it deals with matters beyond
the scope of UCC Article 9 such as possessory liens and leases of personal
property.
731 WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 4-2101, https://warmsprings-nsn.gov/bchapter/
personal-property-secured-transactions-statutory-liens/ [https://perma.cc/AJ5M-
Z8WZ].
68. In 1989, the Chitimacha adopted a commercial code based in part on provi-
sions of the UCC. In 2004, the tribe amended the code to include a provision on
secured transactions, modeled on the UCC. See 18 CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE
CODES OF JUSTICE § 101 (2004), http://www.chitimacha.gov/sites/default/files/CCCJ
%20Title%20XVIII%20-%20Tribal%20Bond%20Legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/
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(Montana, 1992),69 the Hoopa Valley Reservation (California, 1998),70
the Mississippi Choctaw Reservation (2011),71 the Northern Chey-
enne Indian Reservation (Montana, 1998),72 and the Sisseton Wahpe-
ton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation (South Dakota, 1996).73
D. Tribes That Have Adopted the MTSTA or the R-MTSTA
into Tribal Law
In 2002, the ULC convened with the participation of tribal repre-
sentatives to create a uniform code that would facilitate economic de-
velopment.74 The project’s purpose was to “cultivate an environment
GG6B-JRRF]. The ordinance describes itself as limited to sales of accounts and chat-
tel paper in its title, but the provisions of the law more closely resemble the more
comprehensive approach of the UCC toward personal property. See id. § 101(F).
69. See 24 FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE § 802 (1992)
(on file with Author). In 1992, the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck
Reservation in Wyoming adopted Sections 9-901, 9-202, and 9-903. Section 9-901 in-
corporates the most recent version of the UCC as adopted by the ALI and NCCUSL
relating to the sales of accounts and chattel paper. It further provides for self-help
remedies that do not otherwise conflict with tribal laws relating to self-help reposses-
sion. Chapter 8 of the tribal code restricts self-help repossession to cases where the
owner of the property to be repossessed has given written permission for the creditor
to repossess.
70. On June 8, 1998, Ordinance Number 10-98, known as the “Ordinance of the
Hoopa Valley Tribe Regarding Approval of the Tribal Commercial Transactions
Code,” Title 57 of the Hoopa Tribal Code, was approved. That Code includes a se-
cured transactions code dealing with sales of accounts and chattel paper. See 57
HOOPA TRIBAL CODE § 2.101 (1998), https://www.hoopa-nsn.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/Title57-CommercialTransactions062098.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C57-
9N82]. The ordinance adopted by the Hoopa Valley Tribe was based on a model se-
cured transactions law created by the University of Montana’s Tribal Indian Law
Clinic. See Bruce A. King, The Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act, INDIAN L.
NEWSL. 1, 4 (Jan. 2007), https://narf.org/nill/bulletins/lawreviews/articles/indianlawn-
ewsletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/233R-MUUH].
71. See 26 MISSISSIPPI CHOCTAW TRIBAL CODE § 26-1-1-2(6) (2011), http://
www.choctaw.org/government/tribal_code/Title%2026-%20Uniform%20Commercial
%20Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPM3-G7NX].
72. On October 23, 1998, the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Council adopted Resolu-
tion No. DOI-013(99), known as the Northern Cheyenne Uniform Commercial Code.
See NORTHERN CHEYENNE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1999), https://narf.org/nill/
codes/northern_cheyenne/ucc.PDF [https://perma.cc/T35C-FL8S]. The Code applies
to sales of accounts and chattel paper. Id. § 9-101.
73. In 1996, under tribal council resolution No. SWST 96-078, the Sisseton Wahpe-
ton Oyate Tribe of the Lake Traverse in South Dakota adopted portions of the UCC
for creations of security interests in chattel paper and accounts. See SISSETON-WAHPE-
TON SIOUX TRIBAL CODE § 69-18-01 (1996), https://narf.org/nill/codes/sis-
seton_wahpeton/Chapter69.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WMC-3N98].
74. William Henning & Fred Miller, State of the UCC: A Look Back at 2007, 64
UCC BULL. 1, 3 (2008) (noting that the emergence of the MTSTA arose because of
identified needs to facilitate economic activity on tribes by facilitating access to
credit); Tim Berg, Growing Indian Economies, ARIZ. ATT’Y 30, 32 (2006), https://
www.myazbar.org/azattorney/pdf_articles/0306tribal.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWH2-
D9AT] (“Access to financing and capital is key to economic growth, and such access
is hampered in Indian Country by the lack of standard laws governing business and
lending transactions.”).
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conducive to entrepreneurship, lending, and investment,” in tribal ter-
ritories.75 In 2001, the Federal Reserve Board in Minneapolis con-
ducted a study that found “as [t]ribal economies expand and capital
needs increase, [t]ribal governments need to cultivate an environment
conducive to entrepreneurship, lending and investment. A key com-
ponent of that type of environment is a legal infrastructure that sup-
ports contract enforcement and facilitates commercial activity.”76
Subsequently, the ULC put forth a revision of the MTSTA. The pro-
ject was supported by a cross section of tribes from across the country,
though not all the tribes that participated in the project have adopted
the uniform law designed for tribes.77
Thirteen tribes have adopted the MTSTA: the Northern Arapaho
Tribe of the Wind River Reservation (Wyoming, 2014),78 the Chip-
pewa Cree Tribe (Montana, 2012),79 the Colville Reservation (Wash-
ington, 2011),80 the Fond du Lac Reservation (Minnesota, 2010),81
75. See also HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 46, § 9-101:2. The 2005 Implementa-
tion Guide identifies the purposes of the Model Act as: “(1) to assist tribal legislatures
in their review, adaptation and enactment of the Act; (2) to facilitate the use and
understanding of the Act by tribal judges, legal counsel and individuals promoting
business development in Indian Country; and (3) to assist nontribal lenders and busi-
nesses in understanding the similarities and differences between the Act and corre-
sponding provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (‘UCC’).” Id.
76. Id. The commission worked with appointed members of numerous tribes with
the support of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis to create a model secured
transactions law adapted from Article 9 of the UCC. The committee grappled with
issues of adapting Article 9 of the UCC to be a suitable use for tribes. Concerns of the
committee included: “simplifying the act; appropriately reflecting tribal law, customs,
and traditions; integrating the act into whatever body of commercial law might exist
within a particular tribe; protecting the sovereign immunity of a tribe; and preserving
the core concepts of Article 9 so that tribal and state law can be harmonized to the
extent practicable.” Id.
77. Notably, the Nez Perce Tribe and the Umatilla Tribe have yet to adopt any
secured transactions law. See William H. Henning, A History and Description of the
Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act Project, INT’L ASS’N COM. ADM’RS 1, 3 https://
www.iaca.org/wp-content/uploads/MTSTA_Article.pdf [https://perma.cc/NR9Q-
95M3].
78. In 2013, the Arapaho Tribe of the Wind River Reservation adopted a modified
version of the MTSTA and UCC Article 9, effective December 1, 2014. See 18
NORTHERN ARAPAHO TRIBAL CODE § 9-701 (2014), http://northernarapaho.com/wp/
bfd_download/title-18-ucc/ [https://perma.cc/UX2B-YGPU]. The Arapaho version of
the UCC adopts the substance of the MTSTA with the numbering system of the UCC,
reserving inapplicable UCC sections for future use. See id.
79. The adoption of the MTSTA includes the Chippewa Cree Band at Rocky
Boy’s Reservation and Off-Reservation Trust Land, Montana. See CHIPPEWA CREE
TRIBE SECURED TRANSACTIONS CODE (2012), https://sosmt.gov/Portals/142/Business/
Forms/UCCTribalNations/UCC_Article_9_Secured-Chippewa_Cree_2012_(Final).pdf
[https://perma.cc/HL7D-LLW4]. See also HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 46, § 9-101:2.
80. See 12 COLVILLE TRIBAL CODE § 12-9 (2011), https://www.cct-cbc.com/s/12-
9.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG3J-PRKR].
81. In 2010, the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa adopted Ordi-
nance No. 07/10, incorporating the MTSTA provisions for the tribe. See generally
FOND DU LAC BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA SECURED TRANSACTIONS ORDI-
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Leech Lake Reservation (Minnesota, 2010),82 the Oglala Sioux Tribe
(South Dakota, 2008),83 the Rosebud Sioux (South Dakota),84 the Sac
and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma (2007),85 the Seminole Nation of
Oklahoma (2007),86 and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (the Dakotas,
2009).87 At the time of this Article’s publication, no tribes have
adopted the R-MTSTA.
E. Tribes That Have Adopted a Non-Uniform
Secured Transactions Law
Several tribes have adopted laws that either create non-uniform
ways of establishing secured transactions in their tribal territories, or
that attempt to reconcile the existence of security interests created
outside of tribal law. These non-uniform adoptions vary widely in
both the scope and matter addressed:
• The Crow Creek Sioux Tribe adopted a non-uniform law relat-
ing to the creation of pledges and other security provisions on
tribal lands.88
• The Eastern Shoshone appear to recognize the existence of
creditors’ remedies and security interests but do not define them
or set them out in particular. Chapter 14-15-1 limits the ability of
creditors to use self-help and acceleration remedies and pro-
NANCE (2010), http://www.fdlrez.com/government/ords/07-10SecuredTransactionsOr-
dinance_2016.03.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AAQ-ARES].
82. HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 46, § 9-101:2.
83. On July 30, 2007, the Oglala Sioux Pine Ridge Reservation adopted the MT-
STA. See Sue Woodrow & Dani Daugherty, Oglala Sioux and State of South Dakota
Sign Historic Lien-Filing Agreement, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Nov. 1, 2008),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2008/oglala-sioux-and-state-of-south-dakota-
sign-historic-lienfiling-agreement [https://perma.cc/NN9Q-25SC].
84. See generally 14 ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBAL CODE, https://www.narf.org/nill/
codes/rosebudcode/title14commcode.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL8L-S7AL]; see also
South Dakota Tribal Court Handbook (2006), https://ujs.sd.gov/uploads/docs/Indian
Law%20Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4ZZ-CRRH]; HAWKLAND ET AL., supra
note 46, § 9-101:2.
85. The Sac and Fox UCC became effective on September 1, 2007. See 27 SAC &
FOX NATION CODE OF LAWS § 9-701 (2007), http://sacandfoxnation-nsn.gov/sites/sfna-
tion/uploads/documents/SF_CODES_Law/code_of_laws/27_UCC_-_Article_9_-_Se-
cured_Transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7TQ-RBXZ]; see also HAWKLAND ET AL.,
supra note 46, § 9-101:2.
86. See 29 SEMINOLE NATION OF OKLAHOMA CODE (2007), https://narf.org/nill/
codes/seminole_nation_ok/index.html [https://perma.cc/7PW5-F9KX].
87. The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe adopted its first commercial code in 1999. See
South Dakota Tribal Court Handbook, S.D. UNIFIED JUD. SYS. 1, 44 (2006), https://
ujs.sd.gov/uploads/docs/IndianLaw%20Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4ZZ-
CRRH]. In 2009, the tribe adopted a revised, but temporary, commercial code under
Resolution 538-09. That Code was abrogated in favor of the current commercial code
adopted June 4, 2014. See 24 STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBAL CODE OF JUSTICE § 1
(2014), https://www.standingrock.org/sites/default/files/uploads/title_xxiv_-_stand-
ing_rock_commercial_code.pdf [https://perma.cc/L445-2JRU].
88. See CROW CREEK SIOUX CODE § 8-2 (1997), https://narf.org/nill/codes/
crow_creek_sioux/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q3J4-FJX3].
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vides for an action to foreclose on interests in personal
property.89
• The Fort McDermitt Paiute and Shoshone Tribe has a non-uni-
form limitation recognizing the enforceability of security inter-
ests, while limiting the mechanisms creditors can undertake to
foreclose on personal property.90
• The Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation adopted an ordinance that
allowed the tribe to create a security interest in (or pledge) to
“secure directly or indirectly the payment of principal or re-
demption price of, or interest on, any bonds . . . .”91
• The Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota’s code provides for
certain creditors’ rights and responsibilities. Particularly, the
code provides for the enforcement of a security interest through
tribal courts.92
• Finally, the Kalispel Indian Community has repealed a secured
transactions law but has not replaced it with another.93
F. Tribal Approaches to Filing Systems
The tribes that have adopted secured transactions laws have also
lacked uniformity about where to file those interests. The tribal laws
reveal three approaches tribes have taken for addressing where filing
should occur: (1) entering into compacts with local state filing offices;
(2) incorporating a local state filing system without entering into a
compact with the state; and (3) maintaining a filing system on tribal
lands. Five tribes in three states have entered into compacts for the
local state filing office to handle tribal filing:
• Montana entered into compacts with the Crow Nation in 200894
and with the Chippewa Cree tribe in 2017.95
89. See 14 EASTERN SHOSHONE CODE §§ 14-15-1, 14-15-2 (2004), https://
www.windrivertribalcourt.com//wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Title_XIV.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7F65-XPNL]. See also HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 46, § 9-101:2.
90. See 20 FORT MCDERMITT PAIUTE AND SHOSHONE TRIBE CODE § 1 (2015),
https://www.narf.org/nill/codes/fort_mcdermitt/ch20.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UMY-
FTAR].
91. See THE FORT MCDOWELL YAVAPAI NATION LAW & ORDER CODE § 2-100
(2015), https://www.fmyn.org/wp-content/uploads/Fort-McDowell-Word-Proofs-3-27-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPQ5-VE8M]. The law does not provide a mechanism or a
designation for filing of competing interests. Id.
92. 9 YANKTON SIOUX TRIBAL CODE § 9-1-2 (1995), https://narf.org/nill/codes/
yanktoncode/yanktoncodet9creditors.html [https://perma.cc/MCM9-S7KA].
93. The tribe’s former secured transactions law was in the tribe’s Commercial
Code. 28.28 KALISPEL CODE (West, through Mar. 28, 2012). It has been repealed.
94. See Crow Nation, State of Montana Sign UCC Filing Compact, FED. RES.
BANK MINNEAPOLIS (May 1, 2008), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2008/
crow-nation-state-of-montana-sign-ucc-filing-compact [https://perma.cc/P3MJ-
7MBY]. The Crow Nation was the first tribe in the country to enter into a filing com-
pact with a state government. Id.
95. See generally Compact Between Chippewa Cree Tribe of Rocky Boy’s Reserva-
tion and Office of the Montana Secretary of State for a Joint Sovereign Filing System,
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• South Dakota entered into compacts with the Cheyenne River
Reservation in 200096 and the Oglala Sioux Tribe in 2008.97
• Minnesota entered into a compact with the Leech Lake Reser-
vation for filings with the secretary of state.98
So far, the compacts have had limited effect. For example, to date only
one tribe in Montana has had filings filed under the state compact—
the Crow Tribe. Since 2008, the Montana Secretary of State has re-
ceived only eighty-seven filings under the state compact. That number
shrinks again when we consider the number of filings made as dupli-
cates, amendments, or termination statements. Thirty-two of the fil-
ings were duplicated across the UCC filing system and the agricultural
lien filing system, reducing the total number of original filings to fifty-
five. Those filings all originated from seven creditors since 2008.99
The most common approach to filing systems by tribes is to incor-
porate a local state filing system without entering into a compact with
the state. The effect of these provisions is difficult to measure. Unlike
the tribes that have entered into compacts with their states, where no
compact exists, states do not track whether a financing statement has
been entered into under state law or tribal law.100 Tribes that identify
state filing offices as the place for filing financing statements but that
lack a compact with the state include the following:
MO. SECRETARY ST. (Apr. 4, 2017), https://sosmt.gov/Portals/142/Business/Forms/
UCCTribalNations/ChippewaCreeCompact.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5NY-EYSH].
96. See generally Joint Powers Agreement Between South Dakota Secretary of State
and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, S.D. SECRETARY ST. (July 2000), https://sdsos.gov/
docs/ucc-docs/Cheyenne%20River%20Sioux%20Tribe%20Joint%20Powers%20
Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/4N7S-7R99].
97. Woodrow & Daugherty, supra note 83.
98. See generally Leech Lake Band and State of Minnesota Sign Lien-Filing Agree-
ment, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Jan. 1, 2012), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
article/2012/leech-lake-band-and-state-of-minnesota-sign-lienfiling-agreement [https:/
/perma.cc/FH63-KVEJ].
99. See Report from Montana Secretary of State (November 2019) (on file with
Author).
100. This inability to track data relating to tribal transactions has become an in-
creasing source of frustration amongst researchers seeking to understand tribal com-
mercial practices more completely. There are good reasons why tribes may be
reluctant to participate with researchers attempting to understand tribal practices
more completely. For example, Bryan McKinley Brayboy and Donna Deyhle note
that “sometimes researchers are ‘blocked’ by participants who decide they are unwor-
thy or not to be trusted with local ‘insider’ information.” Bryan McKinley Brayboy &
Donna Deyhle, Insider-Outsider: Researchers in American Indian Communities, in 39
THEORY INTO PRACTICE 163, 163 (2000). As they go on to say, gathering Native
American stories, of which commercial practices and legal structural processes are an
integral part, see, e.g., Jessica Shoemaker, The Challenges of American Indian Land
Tenure and the Vastness of Entrepreneurial Potential, in CREATING PRIVATE SECTOR
ECONOMIES IN NATIVE AMERICA: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ENTRE-
PRENEURSHIP 67 (Robert J. Miller et al. eds., 2019),  is “particularly political because
of the history of research in the lives of indigenous people.” Brayboy & Deyhle, supra
note 100, at 163. Still, this means that researchers must do a better job building trust
within tribes to build thicker descriptions.
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• Alabama: the Poarch Band of Creeks101
• Arizona: the Pascua Yaqui Reservation102
• California: the Rincon Band of Luiseño Indians,103 the San Ma-
nuel Band of Mission Indians104
• Connecticut: the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe,105 the Mohegan
Tribe106
• Iowa: the Ponca Tribe107
• Michigan: the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians,108 the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians,109 the Not-
tawaseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi,110 the Pokagon Band
of Potawatomi111




102. See 7 PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE §§ 5-10, 5-20 (2010), https://
www.pascuayaqui-nsn.gov/_static_pages/tribalcodes/docs/7_PYTC/5_Secured_Trans-
actions.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FGK-DREE].
103. See 6 RINCON TRIBAL CODE § 6.500 (2008), https://rincon-nsn.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/6_0500-Tribal-Uniform-Commercial-Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JU6N-SGTY].




105. See 9 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION CODE § 1 (2008) (on file with
Author).
106. See Mohegan Tribal Ordinance 95-720-1 (1995) (on file with Author).
107. See 13 PONCA TRIBE OF NEB. TRIBAL CODE § 13-4-1 (2009), https://
www.poncatribe-ne.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/law_codetitle_v13_190501.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9EDA-B42A].
108. See 15 GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL
CODE § 104(a) (2012), https://narf.org/nill/codes/grand_traverse/Title_15.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YA4C-4URK].
109. Tribal law identifies both the Secretary of State’s office in Michigan and the
Tribal Court as necessary places to file a financing statement for pledges of revenues
that belong to the tribe. See LITTLE RIVER SECURED TRANSACTIONS ORDINANCE
§ 4.04, https://www.lrboi-nsn.gov/images/docs/council/docs/ordinances/Tribal_Secured
_Transactions_Ordinance_04-800-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5MH-88TU]. It states,
Notwithstanding any other provision of the contract UCC, the Michigan
UCC, or this Ordinance to the contrary a security interest granted in
Pledged Revenues in which the applicable Tribal Party has rights shall be
created and attach upon the giving of value and the granting of such a secur-
ity interest by such Tribal Party in a writing executed by that Tribal Party,
and such security interest may be perfected only by the filing of an initial
financing statement with respect to such security interest with the Tribal
Court and in the Office of the Secretary of State for the state of Michigan as
if all of such Pledged Revenues were accounts.
Id.
110. See 4 NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI § 4.1-4 (2008),
https://ecode360.com/29876612 [https://perma.cc/Q2JJ-Y3MV].
111. See generally POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS SECURED TRANSAC-
TIONS CODE (2005), http://www.pokagonband-nsn.gov/sites/default/files/assets/depart-
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• Minnesota: the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa,112 the Sault Ste.
Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians113
• Montana: the Fort Peck Indian Reservation114
• Nevada: the Stockbridge-Munsee Tribe115
• North Carolina: the Eastern Cherokee Reservation116
• North Dakota: the Fort Berthold Reservation, the Spirit Lake
Tribe117
• Oregon: the Warm Springs Reservation118
• South Dakota: the Northern Cheyenne Reservation,119 the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe,120 the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe121
• Texas: the Kickapoo Traditional Tribe122




112. See 18 MILLE LACS BAND STAT. ANN. § 301 (2014), https://millelacsband.com/
content/3-government/13-legislative-branch/title-18-commercial-practices.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E4DQ-XS7Y].
113. See 99 SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL CODE
§ 99.101 (2005).
114. See 24 FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE § 802 (1992)
(on file with Author).
115. See 57 STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE TRIBAL LAW § 59.1(b) (2005), https://
www.mohican.com/mt-content/uploads/2015/11/ch-59-ucc_final_6-29-
09_563a76ca77ea4.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJ9T-FF2T].




117. 10 DEVILS LAKE SIOUX LAW AND ORDER CODE § 11 (1988), http://
www.spiritlakenation.com/data/upfiles/media/Title_11_Commercial_Code.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QPM6-UVX8].
118. 731 WARM SPRINGS TRIBAL CODE § 4-2101, https://warmsprings-nsn.gov/
bchapter/personal-property-secured-transactions-statutory-liens/ [https://perma.cc/
AJ5M-Z8WZ].
119. See NORTHERN CHEYENNE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1999), https://
narf.org/nill/codes/northern_cheyenne/ucc.PDF [https://perma.cc/T35C-FL8S].
120. See generally 14 ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBAL CODE, https://www.narf.org/nill/
codes/rosebudcode/title14commcode.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL8L-S7AL].
121. See 24 STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBAL CODE OF JUSTICE § 24-501(a) (2014),
https://www.standingrock.org/sites/default/files/uploads/title_xxiv_-_standing_rock_
commercial_code.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Y6N-FGMS].
122. See 25 KICKAPOO TRADITIONAL TRIBE OF TEXAS CODE § 1 (2012) (on file
with Author).
123. See 12 COLVILLE TRIBAL CODE, § 12-9-120 (2011), https://www.cct-cbc.com/s/
12-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG3J-PRKR].
124. 26 LUMMI NATION CODE OF LAWS § 26.03.010(a) (2016), https://narf.org/nill/
codes/lummi/26Commercial.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H54-LU95].
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• Wisconsin: the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe,125 the Red Cliff
Band of Lake Superior,126 the Snoqualmie Tribe127
• Wyoming: the Arapaho Tribe of the Wind River Reservation128
States that accept tribal filings without compacts do not maintain data
regarding the number of creditors. In effect, these filings are commin-
gled into the state’s other filings.
Currently, twenty-two tribes maintain their own filing system on tri-
bal lands. These are divided between filings made in tribal courts, fil-
ings made with other tribal administrative offices, and filings made in
security-interest-specific filing offices.
• Eight tribes currently require filings in the tribal court, either
with the tribal clerk of court or other office within the court sys-
tem: the Bay Mills Indian Community,129 the Blackfeet Reserva-
tion,130 the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana,131 the Fond du Lac
Reservation,132 the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians,133 the
Mississippi Choctaw Reservation,134 and the Sac and Fox Nation
of Oklahoma.135
• Nine tribes require filing in other tribal administrative offices.
For example, the Chevak tribe requires filings with the office of
125. See FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SECURED
TRANSACTIONS ORDINANCE § 5.1(A) (2005), https://www.fcpotawatomi.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/06/Chapter-5-5-UCC-05.09.2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHT2-
2KRS].
126. See 52 RED CLIFF BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA TRIBAL CODE
§ 52.2.4, http://redcliff-nsn.gov/Government/TribalChapters/Chapter52.pdf [https://
perma.cc/962Z-MPKP].
127. See 14.3 SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL CODE § 3.0 (2008), https://www.snoqualmie
tribe.us/sites/default/files/secured_transactions_act.14.3.codified.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6EDL-BJEF].
128. See 18 NORTHERN ARAPAHO TRIBAL CODE § 9-701 (2014), http://northern
arapaho.com/wp/bfd_download/title-18-ucc/ [https://perma.cc/UX2B-YGPU].
129. See SECURED TRANSACTIONS ORDINANCE OF BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMU-
NITY § 1 (1994), http://www.baymills.org/resources/Secured%20transactions%20or
dinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/37MV-BEJR].
130. 1 BLACKFEET COMMERCIAL CODE (1990), https://www.narf.org/nill/codes/
blackfeetcode/ord81.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TN6-PQZ3].
131. See 18 CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUSTICE § 101 (2004), http://
www.chitimacha.gov/sites/default/files/CCCJ%20Title%20XVIII%20-%20Tribal%20
Bond%20Legislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG6B-JRRF].
132. See generally FOND DU LAC BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA SECURED
TRANSACTIONS ORDINANCE (2010), http://www.fdlrez.com/government/ords/07-10Se-
curedTransactionsOrdinance_2016.03.10.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AAQ-ARES].
133. See Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, Ordinance No. 04-800-01 § 5.02
(2004), https://www.lrboi-nsn.gov/images/docs/council/docs/ordinances/Tri-
bal_Secured_Transactions_Ordinance_04-800-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXK8-LDSP].
134. See 26 MISSISSIPPI CHOCTAW TRIBAL CODE § 26-1-1-2(6) (2011), http://
www.choctaw.org/government/tribal_code/Title%2026-%20Uniform%20Commercial
%20Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPM3-G7NX].
135. See 27 SAC & FOX NATION CODE OF LAWS § 9-701 (2007), http://sacandfoxna
tion-nsn.gov/sites/sfnation/uploads/documents/SF_CODES_Law/code_of_laws/27_
UCC_-_Article_9_-_Secured_Transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7TQ-RBXZ].
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the principal chief; the Chehalis Tribe,136 the Lac Courte Oreil-
les Band of Lake Superior Chippewa,137 the Muscogee Creek
Nation, the Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa,138 and
the Turtle Mountain Reservation139 require filings with the sec-
retary of the tribe; the Hoopa Valley Reservation requires filings
with the Tribal Department of Commerce;140 the Ho-Chunk Na-
tion requires filings in the Nation’s Land Records Office;141 and
the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma requires filings with the Tri-
bal Office of the Commission.142
• One tribe created a filing system specifically to take security in-
terest filings: the Navajo Nation in Arizona.143
• Ten tribes either have no stated filing system in their law or their
filing system is unknown: the Bois Forte Reservation, the Crow
Creek Sioux Tribe,144 the Eastern Shoshone145 and Northern
Arapaho146 Tribes of the Wind River Reservation, the
Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, Fort McDowell Yavapai Na-
tion,147 the Oneida Nation, the Osage Nation, the Omaha Tribe,
the Southern Ute Reservation,148 and the Yankton Sioux Tribe
of South Dakota.149
136. See 9 CHEHALIS TRIBE CODE § 9.25.010 (1995) (on file with Author).
137. See 12 LAC COURTE OREILLES BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA INDIANS
TRIBAL CODE § 16–21 (2010) (on file with Author).
138. See SAC & FOX NATION CODE OF LAWS § 4-2101 (2007) (on file with Author)
(incorporating the UCC as adopted by the ULC).
139. See TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 24.4501 (2012), https://www.tm.edu/wp-content/uploads/files/Academics/Paralegal
%20Resources/TITLE%2024-Commercial.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY8V-Y5NR].
140. See 57 HOOPA TRIBAL CODE § 2.101 (1998), https://www.hoopa-nsn.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/Title57-CommercialTransactions062098.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5C57-9N82].
141. See 5 HO-CHUNK NATION TRIBAL CODE § 7.4(b) (2005), https://ho-chunkna-
tion.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/5HCC7Uniform-Commercial-Code-Ordinance-
05.05.05.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX88-9HE5].
142. See 29 SEMINOLE NATION OF OKLAHOMA CODE (2007), https://narf.org/nill/
codes/seminole_nation_ok/index.html [https://perma.cc/7PW5-F9KX].
143. See Bruton, supra note 65.
144. See generally CROW CREEK SIOUX CODE (1997), https://narf.org/nill/codes/
crow_creek_sioux/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q3J4-FJX3].
145. See generally EASTERN SHOSHONE CODE (2004), https://www.windrivertribal
court.com//wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Title_XIV.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F65-XPNL].
146. See generally NORTHERN ARAPAHO CODE (2018), http://northernarap-
aho.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NA-Code-Title-18-UCC-Secured-Trans.-
Code-8-17-18-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3869-NL3S].
147. See generally THE FORT MCDOWELL YAVAPAI NATION LAW & ORDER CODE
§ 2-100 (2015), https://www.fmyn.org/wp-content/uploads/Fort-McDowell-Word-
Proofs-3-27-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPQ5-VE8M].
148. See HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 46, § 9-101:2.
149. See generally 9 YANKTON SIOUX TRIBAL CODE (1995), https://narf.org/nill/
codes/yanktoncode/yanktoncodet9creditors.html [https://perma.cc/MCM9-S7KA].
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III. SCALING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS AND TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY IN COMMERCIAL LAW
In Part II, I laid out the uniformity and deviations that exist in tribal
secured transactions laws. In this Part, I describe how scale and rela-
tional economic geography offer insights into tribal choices in this
area. The starting point when thinking about how tribes interact with
commercial laws is often their status as a separate sovereign. It is the
status of tribes as sovereigns that creates the authority and the desire
to facilitate economic conditions within their tribal territories. As
Robert Miller notes, unemployment on Indian reservations (with rates
between 20% to 80%) challenges the structural capacity “for commu-
nity building and for preserving a nation and a culture.”150 And it is
the status of tribes as sovereigns that also dictates their desire to re-
tain individual control over the structures and institutions that influ-
ence tribal life. While contested by scholars, economists, and Indian
leaders themselves, some take the view that encouraging growth
through financial institutions (capitalism) is an abrogation of the
tribe’s sovereignty.151
Model legislation on Indian tribes is designed to downscale uniform
law to local levels.152 In turn, the effect is an upscaling of economic
enterprise to have effects beyond the local level by replicating condi-
tions that financial institutions have come to expect when lending
money to individuals, businesses, and governments. Those conditions
include ones that lower costs (and risks) associated with the lack of
knowledge. In short, if everyone is playing by the same rules in the
lending game, then the game is faster, cheaper, and more likely to
have more players. The more deviations that are present introduce
greater amounts of risk and uncertainty diminishing the likelihood of
investment. Localism is one such deviation that has the effect of re-
ducing the ubiquity of commercial law. Thus, understanding how
tribes have implemented model legislation (that upscales economic
growth opportunities) and how they have deviated from model legisla-
tion can highlight the fault lines for how tribes think about protecting
their sovereignty. Similarly, understanding how the formal and or-
ganic relationships emerge in the face of these adoptions can further
explain the tensions that tribes face relating to their sovereignty
claims.
150. MILLER, supra note 9, at 2.
151. See Aaron Drue Johnson, Just Say No (To American Capitalism): Why Ameri-
can Indians Should Reject the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act and Other At-
tempts to Promote Economic Assimilation Comments, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 107
(2010). But see MILLER, supra note 9, at 4 (quoting the Navajo Chairman and Oneida
Principal Chief rejecting the line of thought that assumes embracing capitalism is a
rejection of tribal legacies).
152. Johnson, supra note 151, at 107.
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A. Scaling Secured Transactions Laws in Indian Country
When looking at the way that secured transactions laws have been
implemented, a scale analysis could help explain why some tribes may
experience economic growth and some may struggle to realize eco-
nomic opportunity.
1. Downscaling Uniform Law in Indian Country
When evaluating the approaches by Indian tribes toward secured
transactions, the majority of tribes that have adopted a law have
adopted some variation of a uniform law provision. Out of the sixty-
two adoptions I was able to discover, fifty have adopted either the
ULC version of the UCC, the MTSTA, or have incorporated a state
law on the UCC (which is built on the ULC’s UCC).153 Tribes doing
so are implicitly seeking to incorporate laws that other states and pri-
vate actors have come to rely on in their dealings. Another way of
scaling is by incorporating common mechanics for implementing the
commercial law. Thus, when tribes utilize state filing systems (either
under compact or informally) they scale-up the effectiveness of local
transactions beyond the local context. The scaling of commercial law
to local contexts operationalizes commercial resources by making ac-
cess to the law more uniform. In turn, uniform law has the capacity to
upscale idiosyncratic local transactions by joining the power of re-
gional, state, national, and global actors who share common regimes
and expectations for how commercial law is carried out. This upscal-
ing of localized transactions is carried out with network effects that
join the power of individuals and local communities with the lex mer-
catoria154 that shapes actors and transactions in other places far from
the local tribe. One approach that offers great potential for Indian
tribes in this arena is the development of privatized filing systems,
such as those suggested by William Henning and Susan Woodward,
which would enable tribes to harness their collective power toward a
greater collective benefit.155
The impulse toward harmonization in commercial law is such an old
saw that it has become practically an inherent truth of commercial
growth.156 What uniformity is attributed to is the law’s best attempt to
capture the norms of universal commercial practice and apply it to
local contexts—not quite a lex mercatoria, but also not unbridled lo-
153. See infra Appendix.
154. See Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 369, 373 (2013) (stating the general view of lex mercatoria as an autonomous
transnational commercial law made up of customs and usages prevalent in commer-
cial dealings).
155. See generally Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13.
156. See John Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking,
48 WAYNE L. REV. 1387 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138 (1996).
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calized law with no connection to either commerce or other state ap-
proaches.157 Article 9 of the UCC is regularly heralded as the most
successful of the ULC’s projects for its ability to promote uniform ap-
proaches to secured lending.158 And even in the moments when its
lack of uniformity was an obstacle to its adoption, the reframing of the
Article to achieve a uniform approach in the face of state reluctance
to adopt fixture provisions ultimately proved to be a source of its im-
portance in the world of commercial dealing.159 That uniformity, even
if in name only, bolsters confidence and promotes stability in the
realm of commercial law dealings. The choice to adopt uniform laws
can be seen as a rhetorical aligning of general principles to tribal
practices.
What uniformity then “scales” is the replication of regimes in
smaller contexts that broaden access to resources that otherwise exist
outside of local regions. Commercial law has shown an uncanny ability
to replicate itself over and again regardless of the scale size in which it
is applied. For example, international conventions on secured finance
have broadened the scope of Article 9’s content to a global context.160
A tribe’s choice to adopt uniform approaches to secured transactions
is an explicit attempt to reach beyond the local barriers that may exist
and seek out a common commercial practice.
2. Localizing Commercial Law Efforts on Indian Tribes
Despite the potential that uniformity offers in upscaling local com-
merce to larger streams of resources, tribes can reduce the effect of
uniformity through local interventions. Current tribal practices in se-
cured transactions reveal four ways that local practices interfere with
uniformity. The most obvious way that tribes assert localized varia-
tions in commercial law is by adopting non-uniform provisions. As
noted in part one, several tribes have adopted non-uniform laws that
relate to security interests. These inherently non-uniform provisions
draw territorial maps around the tribe that signal to lenders that busi-
ness is not as usual within tribal lands.
A second local intervention away from uniform approaches to com-
mercial law is by limiting the types of transactions that the law can be
used for. For example, several tribes have adopted a secured finance
law that only applies to sales of accounts and chattel paper. While
these provisions are important (arguably the most important innova-
157. See Cuniberti, supra note 154, at 150.
158. Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13, at 483.
159. See Marc L. Roark, “Opening the Barbarians’ Gate” or Watching the Barbari-
ans from the Coliseum: A Requiem on the Nomos of the Louisiana Civil Law, 67 LA.
L. REV. 451, 483 (2006); Marc L. Roark, Groping Along Between Things Real and
Things Personal: Defining Fixtures in Law and Policy in the UCC, 78 U. CIN. L. REV.
1437, 1499 (2009).
160. Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13, at 478–79.
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tion of Article 9), limiting transactions to only this subset restricts the
power of the law to attract finance to tribes for the overall economic
well-being of all persons. Likewise, tribes assert localized control over
commercial settings by limiting the actors that can access the law.
Nine tribes have adopted provisions that limit the law’s effects to ei-
ther tribal enterprises, the tribe itself, or to non-consumer transac-
tions.161 Like limiting the type of transaction that the law covers, these
provisions create local barriers to its effectiveness. The adage that a
rising tide lifts all boats then rings hollow when some boats cannot
access the water.
Finally, tribes localize commercial law by isolating their filing sys-
tems from either other tribes or from the state where they are located.
Filing systems themselves are scaled productions of the law. They are
scaled because they extend the power of a collective practice to local
regions, while expanding the kinds of resources that local regions have
access to. The idea of a filing system is that it represents convenient
locations where creditors can gather information about debtors they
seek to do business with. Filing systems upscale the resources that are
otherwise unavailable on tribal lands by gathering in convenient loca-
tions information that lenders deem necessary to conduct business. By
making that information universally accessible, filing systems create
networks of lending operations supported by local law. The broader
and more complete the filing system, the more likely that lenders will
see the transaction as not imposing additional barriers.
Consider, for example, the Montana filing system with the Crow
tribe.162 The value of the system is that lenders can gather a more
complete picture relating to debtors in a single location rather than
161. See, e.g., SECURED TRANSACTIONS ORDINANCE OF BAY MILLS INDIAN COM-
MUNITY § 1 (1994); 1 BLACKFEET COMMERCIAL CODE § 2 (1990), https://www.narf.
org/nill/codes/blackfeetcode/ord81.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TN6-PQZ3]; 9 CHEHALIS
TRIBE OF WASHINGTON CODE § 9.25.050 (2020), https://www.codepublishing.com/
WA/ChehalisTribe/#!/ChehalisTribe09/ChehalisTribe0925.html#9.25.080 [https://
perma.cc/5UKL-6CZD]; 2 EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS TRIBAL CODE
§ 16D-1(a) (2001), https://library.municode.com/tribes_and_tribal_nations/east-
ern_band_of_cherokee_indians/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_
CH16DUCORTRCAGAEN_S16D-1ADAR19 [https://perma.cc/924K-YNRT]; 12
WAGANAKISING ODAWAK TRIBAL CODE § 12.203 (2020), https://www.ltbbodawa-
nsn.gov/TribalCode.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7FF-USHD]; FORT MCDOWELL YAVAPAI
NATION LAW & ORDER CODE § 2-100 (2006), https://www.fmyn.org/tribal-govern-
ment/law-and-order-code/ [https://perma.cc/5PQB-5XQN]; 43 POARCH CREEK IN-
DIAN LAW & ORDER CODE § 43-1-1 (2020), https://library.municode.com/
tribes_and_tribal_nations/poarch_band_of_creek_indians/codes/code_of_ordinances
?nodeId=TIT43SETR_CHISETR_S43-1-1PU [https://perma.cc/E64K-6Z37]; PONCA
TRIBE OF NEBRASKA LAW & ORDER CODE § 13-3-1 (2018), https://www.poncatribe-
ne.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/law_codetitle_v13_050120.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B88W-ZGQM]; SAN MANUEL TRIBAL CODE § 25.5 (2016), https://www.sanmanuel-
nsn.gov/portals/1/TribalGovernment/TribalLaws/San_Manuel_Secured_Transactions_
Ordinance_Amended_July_12_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8GF-BVGK]; see also
HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 46, § 9-101:2.
162. See Crow Nation, State of Montana Sign UCC Filing Compact, supra note 94.
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having to allocate resources to learn idiosyncratic systems that have
few filings. Thus, if the Crow tribe’s eighty-seven filings were con-
tained on tribal lands, rather than in the secretary of state’s filing sys-
tem, lenders may shy away from doing business on the tribe. When
filing systems are increasingly isolated from other normal practices, or
are not easily accessible, creditors will be more likely to bypass doing
business where those systems are necessary. One advantage that the
Henning and Woodward approach to a privatized filing system offers
is the capacity to scale up the filing systems for multiple tribes while
reducing the costs and complexity that tribes ordinarily would have to
undertake to make a filing system work.163 The tradeoff, though, is
that tribes lose a certain level of control over the way the filing system
is maintained.
B. Relational Structures Through Commercial Law
The deviations laid out in the Section above suggest that tribes may
realize limited gains from commercial laws when they deviate from
certain uniform practices. Notably, the creation of non-uniform filing
systems is a major barrier to the successful implementation of these
laws, though other limits that I pointed out certainly have similar lim-
iting effects. Because the adoption of secured transactions laws on In-
dian tribes takes place in particular places, and those places have
relationships to individuals, entities (such as states and tribes), and
resources, it is helpful to think about the adoption of these laws in this
context.
Economic geography can offer insights into some of the relevant
questions that non-uniformity may present. Economic geography is
the study of the location, distribution, and spatial organization of eco-
nomic activities across the world or in specific regions.164 Relational
economic geography focuses on the role of individual or institutional
relationships within a proximity for understanding economic relation-
ships.165 Relational economic geography has been criticized for its
lack of precision and tendency to oversimplify causes and relation-
ships relating to economic phenomenon;166 and for the view that the
relations described are adequately explained by other pre-existing
theories.167 The critiques have been built on the imprecision that rela-
tionships are defined within the literature. For example, Peter Sunley
163. Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13, at 498.
164. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY (Gordon L. Clark,
Maryann P. Feldmann & Meric S. Gertler eds., 2000).
165. See Peter Sunley, Relational Economic Geography: A Partial Understanding or
a New Paradigm?, 84 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 1, 4 (2008).
166. Id. at 15.
167. Henry Wai-chung Yeung, Rethinking Relational Economic Geography, 30
TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 37, 46 (2005).
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points out that relational concepts have been applied in multiple ways
in the economic geography literature lending toward its imprecision:
Relational has a dual meaning, ranging from specific forms of rela-
tionships to any exchange, agreement or interaction between two or
more people and this dual meaning has caused considerable confu-
sion . . . . The first has developed from economic sociology and typi-
cally understands relational as signifying interpersonal and
interorganizational networks and connections of a certain type. The
second is linked to post-structuralist thought and uses relational
more broadly to point to the significance of all forms of networks
and relations between entities.168
In short, relational theories at their worst over-emphasize regional
phenomenon to the exclusion of other contextual factors to explain
why certain regions do poorly and others succeed.169
However, that does not mean that economic geography that recog-
nizes relational components is unhelpful in understanding specific ec-
onomic trends. In this context, “relational” can be precisely defined to
mean “specific mode[s] of economic coordination or governance
based on strong ties and long-term, reciprocal relationships.”170 The
literature then presents two distinctive types of relationships and their
impacts on economic success—one being an embedded, organic, natu-
ral relationship which is stylized as “informal, self-enforcing, and sus-
tained by the value of future relationships,” premised on the potential
for future investment that cannot be predicted.171 The second is a
highly formalized, impersonal relationship that is premised on the ba-
sis of social ties and arm’s length bargaining.172 In the former, the rela-
tionship is defined by the proximity of resources, the low barriers
individual actors face in utilizing those resources, and the interper-
sonal connections that can be leveraged in carrying out economic ac-
tivity. Here, insiders tend to prevail due to the intimate knowledge
they have gained by being present and gaining the knowledge of their
surroundings. In contrast, where the relationship is formalized, eco-
nomic activity is atomistic, ritualized, and impersonal, and is primarily
driven by profit seeking and opportunism.173
Tribal adoption of laws relating to commercial practice reflects for-
mal relationships within the tribe. Governmental tribes can formally
adopt laws and treaties designed to facilitate economic growth. For
example, the emergence of model codes designed to import common
commercial language and practices into tribal communities stems
from a formalized power of the tribal government to enact laws for
168. Sunley, supra note 165, at 4.
169. Yeung, supra note 167, at 46.
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the tribe’s wellbeing. One reason for the emergence of these laws is
the concern that the embedded (organic) recognition of tribal self-
government is a barrier to doing business in Indian Country.174
In this context, economic relationships overlap across formal and
informal associations in the context of efforts to promote economic
growth on Indian tribes. Indian tribal governments represent highly
formalized and artificial governing structures over the interests of In-
dian peoples.175 Tribal governments are organized and formalized
through structures imposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and es-
tablished by tribes themselves and contain both formalized and geo-
graphic criteria. Tribal sovereignty suggests that tribes may dictate
their own form of government as they see fit. Thus, tribal governments
range from highly sophisticated forms of government with three
branches of government, human services agencies, and thick bureau-
cracy, to tribal governments that lack any or all of those traits. Like-
wise, the formalized structures emerge through a process of
formalization and recognition by the U.S. government of the tribal
government’s authority.176 The recognition can happen by legislation,
a federal court decision, or by complying with the federal acknowl-
edgement process.
The geographic resources available to tribes, on the other hand, are
more organic. While natural relationships amongst people associated
to tribes emerge and are formalized over time,177 the geographic rela-
tionship of people, tribes, and resources dictate access individuals and
communities have to economic resources. The access (or lack of ac-
cess) to resources shapes formal responses by tribes and states. For
example, some Indian tribes’ lack of lending infrastructure has
prompted trade groups, federal offices, tribes, or states to enact mea-
sures to facilitate conditions that would prompt greater access to capi-
tal.178 Additionally, Indians living on reservations suffer much higher
rates of poverty (28.4%) than the national average (12.7%),179 and
174. Berg, supra note 74, at 32.
175. Richard Loudbear, Indian Country Politics: Theories of Operation and a Strat-
egy for the Nonviolent Seizure of Political Power, 31 AM. INDIAN Q. 66–86 (2007).
176. Curtis Berkey, Implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act, AM. INDIAN
J. 2, 6 (1976).
177. E. Cheyfitz, Savage Law: The Plot Against American Indians in Johnson and
Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh and The Pioneers, in CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IM-
PERIALISM 109–28; Eric Cheyfitz, The (Post)Colonial Construction of Indian Country:
U.S. American Indian Literatures and Federal Indian Law, in THE COLUMBIA GUIDE
TO AMERICAN INDIAN LITERATURES OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945 116 (Eric
Cheyfitz ed., 2006); Adam Crepelle, Decolonizing Reservation Economies: Returning
to Private Enterprise and Trade, 12 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 413, 426 (2019).
178. Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13, at 476.
179. Jessica L. Semega, Kayla R. Fontenot & Melissa A. Kollar, Income and Pov-
erty in the United States: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1, 2 (Sept. 2017), https://
www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/P60-259.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WF7A-W533].
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higher rates than found amongst Indians as a whole (22%).180 The
poverty experienced by Indians on reservations has roots in both for-
malized structural and informal organic sources relating to the geogra-
phy of exclusion.181 Like other minority groups in the United States,
the extent of inequality often has roots in historically accumulated dis-
advantage. That disadvantage started through formal structures that
provided for removal of Indians from their ancestral homes. The dis-
advantage compounded thanks to the poor quality of the land that
they were given to inhabit, limiting their access to resources (organic
relationship to the land).182 There is also a more organic recognition
embedded in U.S. law of tribal self-government. Federal courts have
consistently recognized tribal self-government as a recognition of their
inherent original sovereignty, even if often undoing the tangible reali-
ties of that sovereignty.183 Tribal sovereignty reflects that Indian self-
government does not stem from federal recognition but rather by rea-
son of their original tribal sovereignty.184 The implications of self-gov-
ernment are expressed through treaty-making power and through
sovereign immunity protection.185
These formalized and organic relationships emerge in specific re-
gions that help shape and contextualize how economic relationships
are developed. Tribes themselves exist in specific territories. For in-
stance, tribes with separate sovereigns are organized across bounda-
ries that are either wholly within one state or across a few states.186
Some of those territorial relationships are formalized, like in the defi-
nition of Indian Country in federal statute187 or in stances where
tribes and states enter into treaties or compacts for mutual coordina-
180. American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 2011, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
facts_for_features_special_editions/cb11-ff22.html [https://perma.cc/RE4N-NWJR].
181. DAVID SIBLEY, GEOGRAPHIES OF EXCLUSION?: SOCIETY AND DIFFERENCE IN
THE WEST 9–10 (1995).
182. James J. Davis, Vincent J. Roscigno & George Wilson, American Indian Pov-
erty in the Contemporary United States, 31 SOC. F. 5, 6 (2016).
183. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381 (1896); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217 (1958); Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.
1959).
184. Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 955, 955 (1971).
185. Kunesh, supra note 4, at 398.
186. The four corners tribes in Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona are a
key example.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2020) and 40 C.F.R. § 171.3 (2020) define Indian Country as:
a. all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation;
b. all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state; and
c. all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
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tion or cooperation.188 The relationships that emerge among tribe
members, between tribes and states, and between tribes and inter-
state organizations are more formalized across geographic
resources.189
Evaluating the effectiveness of specific measures designed to ex-
pand economic activity on Indian tribes is one that appears to be more
of an art than a science. One reason for that is the overlap between
formalized structures and organic limitations that each have indepen-
dent impacts on tribal economic growth. For example, tribes in the
Great Plains are typically less prosperous than tribes in other areas of
the United States Tribes that have more sophisticated forms of gov-
ernment, such as tribal court systems, are more economically prosper-
ous than those with more basic forms of government.190
Two researchers published in the American Indian Quarterly a list
of potential obstacles to tribal economic growth.191 These barriers of-
fer a mix of examples of how formal and organic relationships can
limit economic growth. For example, the list begins with the fact that
“tribes and individuals lack access to financial capital.”192 This is an
organic relationship because it reflects the status of tribal economic
resources that are available to tribes and tribal members in particular
locations. At the same time, it is something that the creation of formal
relationships through the adoption of tribal secured transactions laws
attempts to remedy.193
The adoption of systems similar to Article 9 interacts with other
formal and organic limitations present on Indian tribes. For example,
a secured transactions system requires different levels of state bureau-
cracy, such as filing offices or compacts with nearby state offices.194
Secured transactions also require manpower, organizational capacity,
188. For example, the Crow Nation and the State of Montana entered into a com-
pact in 2008 for the joint use of the state’s filing system to facilitate secured transac-
tions laws in tribal territory.
189. Thomas Biolsi, Imagined Geographies: Sovereignty, Indigenous Space, and
American Indian Struggle, 32 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 239–59 (2005); SCOTT, supra note 25;
Cheyfitz, supra note 176; Robert J. Miller, Inter-Tribal and International Treaties for
American Indian Economic Development Symposium: Indigenous Economic Devel-
opment: Sustainability, Culture, and Business, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1103–34
(2008).
190. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The De-
velopment Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RSCH. J.
187 (1998); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, What Can Tribes Do? Strategies and
Institutions in American Indian Economic Development, 18 AM. INDIAN Q. 250 (1994)
[hereinafter Cornell & Kalt, What Can Tribes Do?].
191. Cornell & Kalt, What Can Tribes Do?, supra note 190.
192. Id. at 6.
193. Id. at 8.
194. Marc L. Roark, Secured Transactions Behind the Buckskin Curtain, HOOVER
INST. 1, 7 (2019), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/marc_roark.pdf [https://
perma.cc/US6R-5NDN].
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and resources to make the system searchable.195 Developing secured
transactions systems on an individual basis by tribes would require not
only manpower, but also expertise and financial resources. Bill Hen-
ning, Susan Woodrow, and Marek Dubovec’s proposal of a privatized
nationwide filing system that tribes could subscribe to that would
close the resource gap necessary to implement an Article 9-like sys-
tem, while making access to financing information more ubiquitous
for creditors and debtors (and researchers) alike, is one approach to
closing the resource gap that has been identified as a barrier.196
What efforts like the MTSTA and privatized filing systems attempt
to replicate is the manufacture of “institutional thickness” where pre-
viously absent. Institutional thickness reflects on the presence of insti-
tutional interaction, coalition building, and the emergence of common
mission or enterprise within regions.197 Institutional thickness emerges
from the confluence of both formalized associations and naturally oc-
curring relationships that can be harnessed toward common goals. Re-
search on rural places and institutional thickness suggests that the
stakeholder impact of local elites may have a significant impact on the
development of other factors that would facilitate an institutionally
thick setting.198 Tribal respect for elders and other traditional stake-
holders may hold similar sway in the creation (or stymie) of institu-
tions in Indian Country.
This Part unpacks how institutional thickness is furthered through
the facilitation of secured transactions in Indian Country. Specifically,
I focus here on the emergence of both formal relationships, from sov-
195. Id.
196. Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13. The original plan for this paper
was to use filing systems to evaluate utilization of secured filing systems in tribal com-
munities. However, the fact that tribes have either not set up tribal filing systems on
their own merit or have, in the alterative, contracted with local state partners for joint
filing systems made that research plan impracticable. The fact that states do not have
a way to segregate filing systems also rendered that plan unfeasible. The point here is
that the inefficiencies for mining data relating to tribes do not merely rest on tribes
but also rest on states whose systems are less than optimal for ascertaining this
information.
197. Amin Ash & Nigel Thrift, Living in the Global, in GLOBALIZATION, INSTITU-
TIONS, AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE (Amin Ash & Nigel Thrift eds.,
1996); Alun Jones & Julian Clark, Of Vines and Policy Vignettes: Sectoral Evolution
and Institutional Thickness in the Languedoc, 25 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRA-
PHERS 333, 333–53 (2000).
198. Jones & Clark, supra note 197; Stephanie Lee Black & Carolyn Birmingham,
American Indian Leadership Practices, in AMERICAN INDIAN BUSINESS 125–26 (De-
anna M. Kennedy et al. eds., 2017); Clint Carroll, Conclusion. Sovereign Landscapes:
Spiritual, Material, and Political Relationships to Land, in ROOTS OF OUR RENEWAL
171–82 (2015); Kathy Davis Graves & Elizabeth Ebbott, Shifting Governmental Rela-
tionships, in INDIANS IN MINNESOTA 18 (5th ed. 2006); Clint Carroll, The Spirit of This
Land: Terrains of Cherokee Governance, in ROOTS OF OUR RENEWAL 140–41 (2015);
Andrew M. Miller & Iain Davidson-Hunt, Agency and Resilience: Teachings of
Pikangikum First Nation Elders, Northwestern Ontario, 18 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (2013);
Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLU. L. REV. 1049, 1119 (2007).
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ereign arrangements such as compacts for filing systems and cross-
lateral tribal network effects that influence growth, and the emer-
gence of organic relationships, such as the presence of financial insti-
tutions in Indian Country, that relate to secured transactions
adoptions in Indian Country.
1. Formal Relationships
The steps that Indian tribes have taken toward formalizing relation-
ships with neighboring states and with actors that would come into
Indian Country to do business is partly due to the hostility that federal
courts have treated Indian sovereign claims in recent years.199 As pre-
viously noted, early federal court decisions affirmed that Indian tribes
enjoyed separate status as sovereigns even after first contact.200 But as
one scholar noted, the federal courts in recent years have shown a
willingness to bend away from traditional bedrock principles of tribal
sovereignty and more toward non-Indian interests.201 Public Law 280
made tribal jurisdiction ambiguous where state courts have asserted
jurisdiction over certain matters.202 Thus, in an effort to preserve the
footing that tribes have held under sovereignty principles, federal
courts have tended to formalize through compacts and adoptions of
laws waiving sovereignty in limited contexts or through preserving tri-
bal court jurisdiction to preserve the overall breadth of sovereignty
claims.
Creating formalized relationships through treaties and compacts
can have a Janus-like203 reality for Indian Tribes. On the one hand, the
treaty and compact process reiterates that tribes and states are on
equal footing as sovereigns, capable of administering and governing in
199. Richard J. Ansson, Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians Whom Do Business with
Indian Tribes: Why Several Recent Ninth Circuit Holdings Reemphasize the Need for
Indian Tribes to Enter Into Taxation Compacts with Their Respective State, 78 OR. L.
REV. 501, 503–04 (1999); Kunesh, supra note 4, at 398–400; David H. Getches, Con-
quering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian
Law, 84 CAL L. REV. 1573, 1576, 1627 (1996); Intergovernmental Compacts in Native
American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 922–23 (1998).
200. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); Crepelle, supra note 177, at 143;
Kunesh, supra note 4, at 416; Biolsi, supra note 189, at 242; Getches, supra note 199,
at 1599; Ansson, supra note 199; Graves & Ebbott, supra note 198.
201. Getches, supra note 199, at 1573.
202. Codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360.
203. The term Janus-like, meaning two-sided, draws on the ancient Roman god Ja-
nus, who was depicted with two faces as he looked to both the future and the past.
The two-fold Janus embodies many dualisms but none so prevalent as how the deeds
of the past shape the markings of the future. “Put aside your fear and learn, laboring
poet of the days, what you seek, and mark my words in your mind. The ancients called
me Chaos (for I was the first thing). Behold the deeds of a long age which I sing.”
Erik, Who Is Your Janus and What Does He Do?, SENTENTIAE ANTIQUAE (Jan. 2,
2020), https://sententiaeantiquae.com/2020/01/02/who-is-your-janus-and-what-does-
he-do/ [https://perma.cc/ZV3F-AZ55] (translating Ovid, Fasti I.63-I32).
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their respective territories. On the other hand, despite these rehears-
als and formalized acknowledgements of tribal self-determinacy, the
history of Indian law is replete with deals that are one-sided and lack
bargaining that is reflective of co-equals.204 As one scholar notes, the
traits of Indian bargaining were stylized through formal recitations of
co-equals sitting at the bargaining table, while the stark reality was
that bargaining was conducted under threat of the sword.205 Thus, we
should not be surprised that the majority of tribes have responded
with skepticism toward the expansion opportunity that limiting their
sovereignty or bargaining for cooperation in contexts of commercial
expansion provide. As the saying goes: been there, done that.
Likewise, the status of tribes as a sovereign (with recourse to all
remedies that a sovereign would expect—like sovereign immunity) is
so tied to Indian identity that waiving claims to sovereignty is no light
matter. Bob Miller emphasizes the care that businesses dealing with
tribal governments should take when dealing with immunity claims:
“[t]ribes expect to have their sovereign status and immunity powers
taken seriously . . . . Consequently tribes are understandably con-
cerned about being asked to waive these . . . powers for every minor
business deal.”206
Still, the desire to further economic growth in Indian Country has
prompted tribes to pursue opportunities that will expand business—
even at the expense of their own sovereignty claims in some instances.
Indeed, as Part I describes, at least 64 tribes—out of the 573 federally
recognized tribes—have adopted some form of secured transactions
law. In building the infrastructure necessary to facilitate these laws,
tribal measures represent a range of approaches from either highly
formalized arrangements through state compacts to no formal struc-
ture at all. Below, I focus on the role of Indian-state compacts in fur-
thering “institutional thickness” and the role of formal waivers of
sovereign immunity in commercial codes as steps toward building for-
mal relationships and enhancing thickness.
a. Manufacturing Institutional “Thickness” Through
Compacts with States
One example of formalized relations on Indian tribes is the use of
compacts with neighboring states. Compacts have been used in several
settings including agreements on taxation of cigarettes and gasoline,207
water rights,208 gambling,209 motor vehicle registrations,210 and sacred
204. Graves & Ebbott, supra note 197; Allan Greer, Dispossession in a Commercial
Idiom: From Indian Deeds to Land Cession Treaties, in CONTESTED SPACES OF
EARLY AMERICA 69–71 (Juliana Barr & Edward Countryman eds., 2014).
205. Greer, supra note 203, at 69–71.
206. MILLER, supra note 9.
207. Ansson, supra note 198, at 547.
208. See In re The Crow Water Compact, 354 P.3d 1217, 1218 (Mont. 2015).
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sites to name a few. In the commercial setting, state compacts relating
to filing statutes and title registry statutes have facilitated formalized
relationships between states and tribes toward creating thicker com-
mercial laws in Indian Country.
As noted in Part I, three states (Montana, South Dakota, and Min-
nesota) have negotiated compacts with local tribes for the administra-
tion through the state’s secretary of state office for filings under the
tribe’s secured transactions laws.211 Notably, the laws themselves are
not necessarily uniform, and reflect different stages of development
by tribes adopting secured transactions laws. For example, the Chey-
enne River Sioux in South Dakota’s laws incorporate South Dakota’s
UCC into tribal law,212 whereas the Oglala Sioux have adopted the
MTSTA into tribal law.213 Similarly, in Montana, the Blackfeet Tribe
has incorporated the ULC’s UCC into tribal law,214 whereas the Crow
Tribe has adopted the MTSTA.215 One might argue that the differ-
ences between all of these laws are negligible since the MTSTA is
based on the ULC’s UCC, which is also the source of South Dakota’s
secured transactions law. Nevertheless, what it demonstrates is that
different tribes chose different approaches to secured transactions
within their tribal territory and yet chose similar ways to facilitate the
administrative necessities for implementing the law in the same way.
The thickness that these tribal compacts represent are part and par-
cel with the expertise and bureaucracy required to effectively main-
tain a tribal filing office. An effective filing system must provide
efficient means for both the filing and searching of lien recordings.216
Filing financing statements and lien statements requires not only the
administrative expertise to develop the filing instrument that captures
the information required under the secured transactions law, but also
the technical expertise to make those forms or resources readily avail-
able to individuals who would file a financing statement in the system.
Creditors using the system seeking to verify their priority status adds
another dimension of expertise and technological capacity in the in-
209. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 39, 39 (2007).
210. Motor Vehicle Licensing Compact Between the Cherokee Nation and the State
of Oklahoma for Lands Located Outside the Compact Jurisdictional Area of the Cher-
okee Nation, CHEROKEE PHOENIX 1, 1 (Sept. 1, 2013), https://www.cherokeephoenix.
org/Docs/2013/8/7512_cou_130813_MotorVehicleCompact2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R8GK-6B9N].
211. Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13, at 491. Additionally, while no
formal compact exists, the Seminole Tribe utilizes the Florida Secured Registry as
authorized by Florida statute.
212. See infra Appendix.
213. See infra Appendix.
214. 1 BLACKFEET COMMERCIAL CODE (1990), https://www.narf.org/nill/codes/
blackfeetcode/ord81.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TN6-PQZ3].
215. See infra Appendix.
216. Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13, at 478.
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dexing of filings. Indexing filed records is crucial for the administra-
tive effectiveness of a system because it permits searchers to easily
discover records associated to either property or debtors, depending
on the nature of the system.217
The thickness that is produced by these systems is also created
through the formal associations between tribes and their states. Those
formal relationships communicate to creditors seeking to do business
on tribal lands that the processes that they are familiar with from
other in-state transactions will remain static in Indian Country. To this
end, the formalizing association also creates a network effect (organic
relationship) which I will discuss in more detail below.
b. Waivers of Sovereign Immunity Relating to Commercial Claims
Just as the creation of formal relationships with state filing offices
facilitates a “thickness” around the mechanics to maintain a filing sys-
tem, Indian tribal waivers of sovereignty also reflect the status of for-
mal relationships that might otherwise discourage financial actors
from doing business in Indian territory. The standard provision in the
MTSTA balances the importance of tribal self-determination, while
providing the possibility that tribes could waive their sovereign immu-
nity in a properly ratified record.218 Still, some tribes have adopted a
non-uniform approach designed to give tribal actors the freedom to
set limits for how they waive tribal immunity if it is in their best
interest.219
217. Id. at 493.
218. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, MODEL TRIBAL SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS ACT § 9-102 (2006) (“No Waiver of Sovereign Immunity: The
Sovereign Immunity of neither this [Tribe] [Nation] nor of any of its agencies or in-
strumentalities is waived with respect to any provision of any transaction sub.”).
219. See 18 NORTHERN ARAPAHO CODE § 9-102 (2018), http://northernarapaho.
com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/NA-Code-Title-18-UCC-Secured-Trans.-Code-8-
17-18-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3869-NL3S].
Section 9-102 - Waiver of Sovereign Immunity; Presumption as to Limitation
of Waiver.
(1) The sovereign immunity of the Northern Arapaho Tribe (Tribe) and/or
any of its respective agencies or instrumentalities is not waived with respect
to any provision or any transaction subject to this Code, absent a recorded,
properly ratified, express waiver of sovereign immunity by resolution or or-
dinance of the Tribe specifically stating its intention to waive such sovereign
immunity.
(2) Any waiver of sovereign immunity meeting the requirements of subsec-
tion (1) shall be presumed, except to the extent the written waiver expressly
provides otherwise, to be:
(a) Granted only to the Northern Arapaho Tribal Court or other Tribal
Court duly authorized by the Tribe;
(b) Limited in scope to monetary relief, not to exceed the amount of the
contract regarding which performance is secured; and
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The balance between reaffirming tribal sovereignty and the poten-
tial for an effectively negotiated waiver is a signal to commercial ac-
tors seeking to do business with the tribe that the tribe will not use its
privilege to deny properly negotiated contractual agreements.220
These provisions could be seen as invitations to the business commu-
nity to create greater formal ties by alleviating concerns that they may
not have a remedy if business goes south. While tribes expect that
businesses will respect the tribe’s status as a sovereign, they have also
shown a willingness to waive immunity in contractual dealings.221
2. Organic Relationships
Just as formalizing relationships contributes to institutional thick-
ness, so too does the existence of organic relationships that draw on
common resources. One example of these types of relationships are
those that exist because of geography or tribal affiliation, rather than
formal associations. Thus, while the creation of tribal-state compacts
for filing systems is a formal relationship, there is also an organic com-
ponent since those tribes are located in states that are receptive to
filing compacts. Organic relationships toward tribal secured transac-
tions can be observed in both the impact of networks that emerge
through legal adoptions and the resources that may be available for
tribes to draw on. This network effect built on proximity can be ex-
tended in other ways when we consider the effect of secured transac-
tions laws in Indian Country.
How Indian tribes adopt secured transactions laws in the first place
is a fruitful area for exploration in future projects. For instance, sev-
eral tribes and individuals with inside knowledge about how tribal
communities adopted secured transactions laws pointed to the role of
“influencers” in shaping tribal decisions to create these laws. Some-
times these influencers may be formal associations, such as with the
Department of the Interior, which encouraged Indian tribes through
financial grants to participate in the drafting process.222 Sometimes,
the influence is more organic, such as when an insider on the tribe
learns about the law and advocates for tribal adoption.223 As Hadley
Louise Friedland suggests in the context of the Cree Tribe, tribal prac-
(c) Authorization of foreclosure only upon collateral expressly pledged as
security.
Id.
220. MILLER, supra note 9.
221. Id.
222. Elaine A. Welle, A Guide to the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act for
Those Familiar with the Uniform Commercial Code, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 467, 468
(2013).
223. MIRIAM JORGENSEN & DANIEL STEWART, CREATING PRIVATE SECTOR ECON-
OMIES IN NATIVE AMERICA: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP 106 (Robert J. Miller ed., 2019).
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tice is well suited for the role of influencers to help steer how tribal
governance is carried out.224
Another way that organic resources influence tribal secured trans-
actions laws is the network effect of multiple similar laws in close geo-
graphic regions. This network effect is when tribes in common regions
adopt similar regimes for facilitating secured transactions. Tribes that
incorporate their local UCC provisions neutralize formal barriers that
may exist between tribes, regions, and economic actors. When multi-
ple tribes adopt the same law, the power of numbers reinforces the
symmetries that may exist between states and tribes. This explains
why relatively few tribes have adopted non-uniform provisions, in-
stead opting for either the ULC version of the UCC, the MTSTA, or a
state-based UCC version. Likewise, all of the tribes that have adopted
secured transactions laws in Michigan and all but one of the tribes that
have adopted secured transactions laws in Washington have incorpo-
rated their state’s UCC law.225 Further, all of the tribes in Wisconsin
that have adopted a secured transactions law have adopted a secured
transactions law that is based on a ULC version of the UCC—either a
state incorporation, the ULC’s UCC, or the MTSTA.226 While these
geographic similarities may not be intentional amongst the tribes, they
do suggest that there are common resources that the tribes value that
are reflected in the common approach to adopting a secured transac-
tions law. A deeper ethnographic dive into how tribes adopted uni-
form provisions is a next step toward unpacking these questions.
A third way organic relationships emerge in the context of facilitat-
ing secured transactions is in the resources that are available to facili-
tate the laws. As noted above, the maintenance of a tribal filing
system is a significant undertaking requiring both manpower, exper-
tise, and spatial resources. A vast majority of tribes have approached
this problem by informally using state filing systems to record financ-
ing statements.227 Those tribes that maintain their own filing system
opt for greater control over the filing systems that are so important in
the Article 9 world over the network effects that drawing on regional
filing systems can facilitate.
In addition to the resources available to facilitate a secured transac-
tions law, tribes also face a “lending desert” that impacts the thickness
of the institutional markets. Back in 2000, an article in Region Maga-
zine highlighted the problems of banking access in Indian Country,
noting the prevalence of thirty-mile drives and non-existent ATM ma-
chines. Drawing on an advocacy group’s term, the article labeled the
224. See generally HADLEY LOUISE FRIEDLAND, THE WETIKO LEGAL PRINCIPLES:
CREE AND ANISHINABEK RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION (2018).
225. See infra Appendix.
226. Id.
227. Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13, at 501.
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problem the “Buckskin Curtain.”228 According to a recent report from
the Center for Indian Country Development, there has not been much
change in access to banking.229 In the absence of traditional forms of
lending, alternatives to banking such as pay-day lenders have ap-
peared; traditional brick and mortar banks continue to be scarce re-
sources on tribal reservations.230 One reason is that traditional federal
banks require significant capital reserves that may tie up too many
resources for tribes to invest in banking.231 A second reason is the
organizational capacity that banking requires due to the degree of reg-
ulatory oversight.232
While traditional banks have not taken root in Indian Country, sec-
ondary financial institutions known as Community Development Fi-
nancial Institutions (“CDFI”) have somewhat filled the gap to provide
lending access on Indian tribes.233 CDFIs, or combined institutions of
banks or credit unions and CDFIs, comprise seventy of the financial
institutions in Indian Country of the ninety-three total native-servic-
ing financial institutions.234 Still, the lack of access to financial institu-
tions in Indian Country is an organic condition that will shape how
extensively Article 9 is used in the short term. Whether the adoption
of uniform secured lending laws has the effect of luring financial insti-
tutions to tribal territories is something to be determined. Neverthe-
less, tribes that adopt secured lending laws set the conditions for
entering the lending and banking sector on their own. The opportu-
nity for tribes to shape the financial well-being of their members may
require the tribe step into the lending gap itself. As with other areas of
lending practice, the network capacity of the tribe to draw on other
resources would be a crucial step toward institutionalizing lending on
its own.
228. Wirtz, supra note 15.
229. Mapping Native American Financial Institutions, CTR. FOR INDIAN COUNTRY
DEV., https://www.minneapolisfed.org/indiancountry/resources/mapping-native-banks
[https://perma.cc/86N2-NBKJ].
230. Ahtone, supra note 15.
231. Banks May Not be Answer to Tribes’ Woes, 60 J. HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. 14, 14 (2003).
232. Id.
233. Ahtone, supra note 15.
234. Mapping Native American Financial Institutions, supra note 229.
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The creation of secured transactions laws was a bet that financial
institutions would come to Indian tribes to fill the financial lending
gap. Arguably, the network effects of tribal adoptions and the dearth
of resources are too low at the moment to evaluate whether the for-
mal adoptions of secured transactions laws can facilitate greater eco-
nomic growth. Indian Country presents the opportunity for creative
thinking for how to stimulate economic growth. Ideas, such as William
Henning and Susan Woodward’s nationalized filing system for Indian
tribes, could help shore up insecurities that exist where tribes lack the
expertise and resources to adequately facilitate a tribal filing sys-
tem.235 It could also bolster the network effects that would help build
institutional thickness for tribes seeking greater economic activity. As
we settle into the next chapter on tribal economic growth, understand-
ing how the laws we encourage tribes to enact interact with formal
and organic resources and how they are upscaled and downscaled by
235. See Henning, Woodrow & Dubovec, supra note 13, at 499–501.
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tribal practice will shape whether the promise of economic growth is
realized through the building of institutional thickness across borders
or through localized thickness within tribal borders.
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